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Chapter I 
1. Introductory Remarks to the Comparative Analysis 
The national reports on post market control represent an overwhelm-
ing magnitude of regulatory mechanisms to withdraw unsafe products from 
the market. There is not yet a common understanding to be found on the 
best potential management of post market control. There seems an overall 
tendency to establish some kind of administrative control of unsafe goods, 
but the exact shaping of the administrative control and especially the extent 
to which these administrative bodies are empowered to take action against 
unsafe products differs considerably. The comparison will focus on these 
administrative control mechanims, but it cannot set aside that some coun-
tries consider product liability legislation as an equivalent to administrative 
control. Monitoring duties imposed on manufacturers should guarantee that 
unsafe products are taken away from the market. Last but not least, activi-
ties of consumer testing organisations and certification bodies have to be 
taken into account in their exercising impact on the manufacturers and ad-
ministrative bodies, getting to get unsafe procuts withdrawn from the mar-
ket. Most countries pursue different approaches to product saf ety regula-
tion, but to a different degree of intensity. The comparison should reflect 
these differences and try to elaborate common trendlines of development in 
post market control regulation. 
But the purpose of the different national reports has not been limited 
to a presentation of post market control regulation. Here reference could 
even be made to previous research emphasizing the role and importance of 
the concrete shaping of regulatory mechanisms1• The very same research, 
however, has more or less set aside aspects of how product safety regulation 
in general and post market control regulation in partieular has been imple-
mented. The national reports are aimed at bridging that gap. That is why 
the the second major objective of the research project on post market con-
trol consisted in evaluating the practice of post market control regulation. 
This is not done by way of a representative analysis. The evaluation of the 
practice on the basis of reports and interviews with national officials allows 
nevertheless for generalized conclusions which might be useful for the on-
going debate on the establishement of an emergency procedure under the 
auspices of the Commission2• The comparison intends to work out common 
1 
2 
Ch. Joerges/J. Falke/G. Brüggemeier/H.·W. Mi~klitz, Die Sicherheit ':'on Ko_nsumgütem 
und die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ZERP-Schnftenre1he Band 2, 
1988. 
OJ No. C 193, 31.7.1989, 1 et seq. 
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trends in the implementation of still heterogenous post market control reg-
ulation. 
II. Systematic Comparison of Post Market Control Regulation 
The intention of the systematic comparison is not so much to give a 
comprehensive overview on differences and similarities in post market con-
trol regulation in the classical sense. The analysis is much more limited. lt 
intends to work out lines of development and trends which should help to 
understand the prospects of post market control regulation. The overview 
concentrates on administrative regulation. This is so for two reasons: here, 
individual state action has taken place in the last decades, and is thus the 
place where further action might be expected in the near future. The per-
spectives and restraints of product liability regulation which should be re-
flected in their impact on post market control have been the subject of a 
conference whose results are separately available now3. The practice of 
product liability regulation as a means of post market control will be con-
sidered however just as the activities of testing groups and certification 
bodies4• 
1. The genesis of post market control regulation 
The development of post market control regulation is enshrined in the 
overall context of the history of product safety regulation. The latter sets the 
frame in which administrative mechanisms of post market control have de-
veloped and are further developing. 
a. Historie sources of product saf ety policy concepts 
There were theoretically four possibilities at hand to regulate product 
safety when the necessity emerged in the sixties for understanding product 
safety as a statutory responsibilitf which needs to be regulated: 
3 
4 
5 
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Ch. Joerges ( ed. ), Product liability and product safety in the European Community, EUI 
Working"l'aper No. 89/404. 
Cf.IV. 
Cf. G. Hermes, Das Grundrecht auf Schutz von Leben und Gesundheit, Schutzpflicht 
und Schutzanspruch, 1987; H.-W. Micklitz, Consumer Rights, Typoscript 1989, as pan: of 
the research project of the European University Institute, Florence, under the direcuon 
of Prof. Antonio Cassese. "Human Rights and the European Community: Towards 1992 
and Beyond", tobe published in 1990. 
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(1) Ta integrate product safety regulations in the quite older occupational 
health a~d saf ety regulation, an approach which has been chosen by 
the FRG and partly by the U .K.7; 
(2) to introduce product safety law in food refulation, what has occured in 
the Netherlands and partially in the FRG ; 
(3) to understand the marketing of unsafe products as unfair marketing 
practice and submit the regulation of product safety to the legislation 
on unfair marketing practices. That is exactly what Sweden9 and Aus-
tralia have done, and here the French10 approach is also grounded; 
( 4) to define product safety as a separate policy which needs its indepen-
dent regulatoft frame. Such an understandin:ß complies best with the 
US approach1 , somewhat copied in France1 and recently introduced 
also in Sweden. 
Proceeding cautiously, it might be possible to discover tendencies 
which facilitate a preliminary orientation. Product safety 1aw seems to enjoy 
the best perspective in a country where the management of unsaf e products 
is understood as part of the regulatory mechanisms governing marketing 
practice regulation. The dynamics of the market process enable a flexible 
integration of the new policy field in old regulatory rules and perrnit within 
this wide umbrella independency to a considerable extent, even where im-
plementation remains in the hands of institutions which are primarily 
charged with quite different tasks. Product safety Iaw seems to meet diffi-
culties in shaking off the historical chains of occupational health and safety 
regulation. Here, product safety appears as mere secondary law which is 
subordinate to the overall protective objectives of occupational health and 
safety. This is true mainly for the FRG, but also for the United Kingdom, 
because implementation lies in the hands of agencies which are primarily 
concerned with occupational health and safety. Product safety takes an in-
between position where it forms an integral part of food law and is imple-
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1. Falke, Die Produktsicherheitspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Ch. 
Joerges et al„ loc. cit. 132 et seq. 
G. Brüguemeier, Konsumgütersicherheitsrecht in Großbritannien, in: Ch. Joerges et al., 
loc. cit. fo6 et seq. 
N. Reich/H.-W. Micklitz, Consumer Legislation in Nine EEC Countries - A Compara-
tive Analysis 1980. 
U. Bemitz/J. Draper, Consumer Protection in Sweden Legislation, Institutions and 
Practice, 2nd Ed. 1986, 121 et seq. 
H.-W. Micklitz, Produktsicherheitsrecht in Frankreich, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 62 
etseq. 
Ch. Joerges Der amerikanische Consumer Product Safety Act und seine Implementa-
tion durch die Consumer Product Safety Commission, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 210 
et seq. 
J. Calais-Auloy, Droit de Ja Consommation, 1980, 110 et seq. 
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mented by the competent agencies. The recently adopted amendment to the 
Dutch Warenwet13 has made clear that it is possible to anchor an indepen-
dent policy field of "product safety" under the umbrella of food law. Food 
law, however, then alters its character. lt becomes a protective legislation 
against health hazards and safety risks. The best perspective for the further 
development of product safety seems to exist in those countries who have 
decided to establish product saf ety as an independent policy area even if 
the necessary administrative structure is still missing. It is not without rea-
son that product safety law and especially post market control in the United 
States has achieved a level of consumer protecti~n, amounting to a night-
mare for some and wishful thinking for others. 
b. The two approaches for regulating product safety14 
The analysis of the different approaches of regulation enhances the 
hypothesis on the possible future development of product saf ety law. His-
torically, there were strongly defined traditions and clearly shaped regula-
tory approaches. The seemingly clear demarcation lines between different 
regulatory approaches, however, become more and more indiscernible. 
Regulatory traditions were set aside in the debate on the "best" regulatory 
approach, and also the most efficient distribution of competence between 
statutory agencies and private standard-setting bodies. Notwithstanding all 
differences in the legal traditions two regulatory models can be clearly de-
fined: 
(1) Framework regulation which needs tobe implemented by specific reg-
ulations in order to attain binding effect. Technical standards are im-
portant as far as they have been integrated in specific regulations. 
Contravention of binding regulations is regarded as a criminal off ence; 
(2) General safety duties imposing on manufacturers an obligation to 
market safe products. The yardstick of safety is laid down in technical 
standards to which the general saf ety duty either explicitly or implicitly 
refers. Non-compliance with technical standards does not necessarily 
entail criminal sanctions. 
The conclusion is, that framework regulation loses importance 
whereas general safety duties in whatever form gain importance15. The shift 
from the framework approach to the general safety duty approach enhances 
13 
14 
15 
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G. ~nijders, _Patterns of Dutch Produ~t Safety Legislation: The Commodity Act 1988 
and tts Relation to the New Approach, in: Ch. Joerges (ed.), loc. cit. 102 et seq. 
The issue is developed in more detail in: H.-W. Micklitz, Perspectives on a European 
Directive on the Safety ofTechnical Consumer Goods, CMLR 23 (1986), 617 et seq. 
This tendency though valid for most of the investigated countries does not hold true for 
Australia. Here the framework character is maintained. The particuliarities of the Aus-
tralian legislation on product safety will be considered in more detail cf. 11.3.b. 
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the existence of an overall statutory responsibility. But the very same expan-
sion of responsibilities shows the limited capacities of a state. lt can realize 
the statutory responsiblity only if it enhances cooperation with private stan-
dard setting bodies. That is why the introduction of a general safety duty 
goes together with a reform of the cooperation between the states and the 
private standard setting bodies. The inherent tendency to return to private 
resources in shaping product safety law entails consequences for the per-
spectives of further developing product safety as an independent area of 
law. 
Frame work regulation, i.e. food regulation16 and also marketing prac-
tice regulation17 traditionally rely on product-specific regulations which 
determine the behaviour of manufacturers and traders. Infringements of 
product-specific regulations are sanctioned with a penalty or with a fine. 
The main administrative task then is to fmd out whether the addressees of 
the law comply with the requirements laid down in the product specific 
regulation. The distribution of competence between parliament, adminis-
trative bureaucracy on the one hand, ( defining the mandatory requirements 
for the marketing of the dangerous products) and specific regulatory agen-
cies on the other, (examining their compliance) is clearly shaped. 
This traditional interrelationship is challenged with the shift from 
framework regulation to the general safety duty approach. The form in 
which the general safety duty as a "general safety requirement" or as 
"ref erence to standard" legislation does not play any role so far. Tue 1987 
amendment of the Consumer Safety Act has introduced a general safety 
duty in the UK. Contraventions to the general safety duty are regarded as a 
criminal offence. A solution which has been sup~orted by the french 
"Commission de la Refonte", but not yet become law 8. The FRG relies on 
reference to standard Iegislation. Manufacturers are · presumed to repect 
the general safety ducy if their products comply with the officially registered 
technical standards19• Neither general safety duty legislation nor reference 
to standard legislation can be implemented in the same way as framework 
legislation. General safety duty legislation in whatever form does not con-
tain concrete yardsticks against which action to be taken measured. Techni-
cal standards can be used as an auxiliary but they do not release the com-
petent authorities from concretising the general safety duty and defining a 
16 Cf. for Netherlands, G. Snijders, in: Ch. Joerges, Joc. cit. 
17 Cf. for Australia, D. Harland, 4; and for Sweden, N. Ringstedt, 4. 
18 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 77. 
19 § 5 para 2 of the Gerätesicherheitsgesetz. 
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safety standard for the product in question20• Control agencies which migbt 
have been established once to exercise compliance of products with 
mandatory safety standards (product specific regulations) have to enter into 
a learning process. Deducing a concrete level of protection from a general 
safety duty requires complex value-judgments21. The distinction between 
"compliance" and "setting safety standards" is crucial for the understanding 
of post market control. 
Food law which is usually based on the interplay between framework 
regulation and specific regulations seems to hinder such a development. 
But even here a shift in the regulatory approach can no longer be excluded. 
The Community is considering the pros and cons of reconstructing 
Community food law according to the model of product safety law. A 
general safety duty should impose on manufacturers and traders an . 
obligation to market only safe foodstuffs, supf;lemented with reference to 
food standards elaborated by private entities 2• Only two legal traditions 
would finally survive, both originating from a coherent regulatory model: 
occupational health and safety and marketing practice regulation. 
c. The concept of safety 
The concept of safety is the starting point of product safety legislation. 
Theoretically it should be possible to derogate a definition of saf ety from 
the existing rules. In practice a cascade of rules is to be found, independent 
of the differences in the regulatory approaches and all providing assistance 
in the definition of that which should be understood as a safe product. 
Heading the list are the legislatory rules, and the diff ering concepts of 
product safety as laid down in the legislation itself. Below the legislative 
targets come the regulatory activites of private standard-setting organisa-
tions. The English, French and German Standard setting institutions have 
developed technical standards defininf a general safety philosophy applica-
ble to all product related standards2 • The principles laid down there are 
then concretized in specific product related safety standards. These rules 
altogether define the concept of safety. Althougb the cascade of rules can 
be found in all industrialized countries they are integrated to a different de-
gree into the regulatory concepts. These diff erences come into play when 
responsibility for the definition of safety is to be determined. The vital issue 
is the identity of those holding the power of definition for the meaning of 
20 Cf. III.1. 
21 Cf. for further details cf. under II.3.a. 
22 Tue Commission, however, seems to reconsider its position OJ C 271, 1989, 3 et seq. 
23 Cf.H.-W. Micklitz, CMLR, loc. cit. 
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safety, narnely, statutory entities and/or private standard setting bodies. 
Reference to standards legislation, though upholding in principle the 
statutory responsiblity for the protection of consumers against unsafe prod-
ucts, provides for cooperation between the standard setting institutions and 
the responsible control entities (Gewerbeaufsichtsämter) in defining the 
notion of safety. The same cannot be said for the other regulatory concepts. 
The definition power remains per se in the hands of the competent entities, 
although the differences in the regulatory concepts seem to vanish in pre-
. 24 sent pract1ce . 
The set of rules is determined, the bearers of the definition power are 
identified, but how is safety defined legally and/or in technical standards? 
Despite the surving inconsistency in terms and terminolgy in legal rules and 
technical standards, there is a common tendency to integrate the expecta-
tions of consumers into the notion of saf ety25. One might attribute this 
cornprornise with the term of "foreseeable use". Foreseeable rnisuse of 
products by consumers, a highly debated issue in product safety regulation, 
is incorporated into the regulatory concept. 
But the categories described so far are quite rough and cannot provide 
much help in actual practice26• Cost benefit analysis has been promoted as 
a new category to be considered in the concept of safety. But its function 
within the regulatory concept is far from clear. The US legislator has re-
pealed cost-benefit rules for the performance of post market control mea-
sures. German product safety legislation remains silent on the role and im-
portance of cost benefit analysis. The Gerrnan Institute for Standardization, 
however, forrnulates a seemingly clear suprernacy rule. Safety ranks before 
econornic efficiency. 
2. The trend towards tnstitutional independency 
All industrial countries show an inclination to put the implernentation 
of product safety Iaw in the hands of specific control institutions. Post mar-
ket control of consumer goods seems to be manageable only in specifically 
equipped central entities. According to the degree of independence three 
types rnight be distinguished: 
(1) Federal agencies empowered with specific regulatory cornpetence 
mainly in the field of post market control, like the US Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC); 
24 Cf. III.3. 
25 Cf. Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 42 et seq. 
26 Cf.III.!. 
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(2) Mixed forms whose integration into the ministerial bureaucracy cliff ers 
considerably, the French Commission de la Securite des Consomma-
teurs (CSC), the English Consumer Safety Unit (CSU), the National 
Swedish Board for Consumer Policies (NSBCP), the Australian Trade 
Practices Commission (TPC) and the Federal Bureau of Consumer 
Affairs (FBCA); the Dutch Consumer Safety Institute (CSI) die 
Stichting Konsumenten Veiligheid as weil as the Nordrhein-Westfälis-
che Zentralstelle für die Sicherheitstechnik (ZSF). 
(3) Where there are no independent central/federal 
administrativ~ entitites, like in the FRG27 and the 
Netherlands2 , ad hoc working groups are set up under 
the ~~spices of the competent ministries in case of 
need . 
a. Consequences of the institutional independence f or the nature of admistra-
tive control activities 
Institutional independance seems to be a precondition for administra-
tive entities to shift from "compliance" to "defining safety standards". "Old" 
traditional control authorities remain restricted in their control tasks. Their 
field of activities comprises only the mandate of examining "compliance" 
with predefined product saf ety standards. They are still seen as the lang 
arm of the ministerial bureaucracy to implement what has been decided at a 
higher level - often within the very same ministerial bureaucracy, some-
times confirmed by Parliament. This distribution of competence 
"compliance" versus "defining safety standards", is mostly provided for ex-
pressly by the legislator in the process of extending product safety legisla-
tion, sometimes it results implicitly from the states' responsibility of pro-
tecting their citizen against health hazards. 
b. Resources30 
Institutional independency can only lead to practical results if the en-
tities are endowed with the necessary personnel and financial resources. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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thc national rcport which will be publishcd at a later stagc in thc ZERP-Schriftcnrc1he 
as a separate volume. 
Cf. B.M. Hummels/G.M.F. Snijders, 5.2. 
Cf. Strictly ~peak;ing, th~re are no rulings provi~ing for the establishment of an indep~n­
dant admm1strat1ve entlty. lt would be m1sleadmg however, to set aside actual pract1ce 
in the FRG and in thc Nethcrlands, although thc cxact handling of risk situations must 
be delt with when it comes down to describe the present practice of post market control. 
Some "unsystematic" figurcs are given already here and not in the part on the practicc of 
post market control. 
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The considerable organisational differences render a comparison rather 
difficult. Administratively independent control entities do not automatically 
have a separate budget at their own disposal. They are normally incorpo-
rated in traditional administrative structures. There are only a few countries 
in which the control of existing standards and the elaboration of new safety 
standards is organized in a separate body. Even where institutional inde-
pendenci has been achieved, specific control entitites are charged, as in 
Sweden3 and Australia32 with quite a different set of regulatory tasks. That 
is why it is so difficult to identify the percentage of the budget which con-
cerns the regulation of product safety. Three different types might be dis-
tinguished: 
(1) Post market control is taken over by occupational health and safety or 
food control agencies, this is true for the FRG 
(Gewerbeaufsichtsämter) for the U.K. (trading standard officers); the 
Netherlands (Keuringsdienst van waren; in Sweden, local consumer 
counsellors); in France (Direction de la Consommation et de la Re-
pression des Fraudes (DCRF). Here, product safety represents only 
one activity in between a couple of others. Nothing but a "quantite 
negligeable" of all the hundreds and thgusands of agents dedicate their 
activity to the control of product safety'3. 
(2) Post market control is taken on by institutions which have to imple-
ment a whole set of consumer protection laws. This is true for the Na-
tional Swedish Board for Consumer Policies as well as for the Aus-
tralian Trade Practices Commission. The Swedish NSBCP engages 215 
persons and has a budget of SEK 45 Mio34• For Australia there are no 
concrete figures available. The National Consumer Affairs Advisory 
Council believes that all over the country 24 persons are engaged with 
the control of product safety alone35• 
(3) Post market control lies in the hands of institutions endowed with the 
unique competence to implementing product safety legislation. The 
American Consumer Product Safety Commission has a bud:füet of 
round about $ 30 Mio and engages 500 full time employees ; the 
French Commision de I17Securite des Consommateurs had ~ budget of 
FF 2.4 Million in 1985 , the Dutch Consumer Safety InsJitute has a 
budget of U$ 3.5 Mio. and engages 50 full time employees3 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
N. Ringstedt, 3. and 4„ especially Figure 1. 
D. Harland, 3. Outline of responsibility for product safety. 
For the FRG 2 2% of all control activities of the the German Gewerbeaufsichtsämter 
are devoted to p~oduct safety, J. Falke, in: Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. 161. 
N. Ringstedt, 3. 
D. Harland, 5.6. 
Ch. Joerges, in: Ch. Joerges et al„ loc. cit. 204 et seq. 
H.-W. Micklitz, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 70. 
B.M. Hummels/G.M.F. Snijders, loc. dt. 
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The United States has taken and is still taking a lead position. The 
different figures available from the European countries as weil as from 
Australia, da not give a clear idea on the perspective of exercising eff ective 
post market control. lt is not the budget alone which decides on the effec-
tiveness of a post market control system39• France, Sweden, Australia, 
Great Britain, to some extent the Netherlands have set up statutory entities 
which work at the national level as central addressees for consumer com-
plaints. The FRG relies on a decentralised approach. The German Gewer-
beaufsichtsämter are operating within the German Länder, they are au-
tonomous. The FRG strongly resists any incentive by the Commission to 
centralize the product safety administration40. The majority of the investi-
gated countries start from the idea that product saf ety can best be realized 
by centralized and highly professionalized control entities. 
3. Development trends in post market regulation 
Although the tendency to coherent extension and differentiation of 
post market control regulation seems inherent to product safety law, na-
tional differences sustain reflecting the differing inertia of the regulatory 
and administrative genesis. Despite these restrictions European countries 
are gradually matching the American product safety law since the late sev-
enties. lt might serve as a yardstick against which the post market control 
mechanisms and post market control instruments can be measured. 
a. Extension of post market control instrnments 
There is no agreement an the terminolgy of instruments. A compari-
son is difficult to manage as each country is living with its own administra-
tive notions. The US Consumer Product Safety Act distinguishes between 
"standards", "ban", "seizure" and "recall"41 . Standards means the elaboration 
of mandatory rulings which the manufacturers have to respect when they 
intend to bring a product onto the market. Standard setting is first and 
foremost a means of preventive action but it can also come to bear as a 
means to guarantee the marketing of safe products from the emergence of 
the <langer onwards42. Standard setting is then future orientated, it can not 
reduce the risks resulting from those products which have already been put 
into circulation. Standard setting exists as a regulatory means in all investi-
39 Cf. II.4. Efficiency of post market control. 
40 Within the debate on the product safety directive, cf. chapter II. 
41 Cf. Ch. Joerges 2.2.1.1. 
42 Cf.III.3.d. 
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gated countries. Its shaping is closely bound to the approach chosen to reg-
ulate product safety43. 
A "ban" stops and/ or restricts the further marketing of a dangerous 
product. The function of a ban is limited. lt blocks the further marketing of 
an unsafe product and sets aside the problem of what should be done with 
the unsafe products circulating around. The instrument has been intro-
duced in all investigated countries whatever its concrete notion might be -
prohibition (UK, NL), banning order (Australia), FRG 
(Untersagungsverfügung), circulation de produit (France). There is agree-
ment on the necessity to prohibit the further marketing of unsafe products 
but there is no agreement on how such a ban should be implemented. Two 
options must be distinguished: (1) A ban may concern a specific product or 
a category of products, it would then be called a "product ban" or a 
"prohibition notice'M, (2) A ban may also be realized in such a way that 
manufacturers and/or suppliers are approached in order to directly prohibit 
further marketing. The UK legislation provides for both paths, the FRG 
allows only for a ban addressed to manufacturers/importers and under re-
stricted conditions to dealers. The overall tendency is to incorporate step by 
step all those addressees involved in thc process of manufacturing and rnar-
keting, the manufacturer, the irnporter and most of all the dealer. 
"Seizure" goes one step further, here the dangerous products are con-
fiscated by the competent authorities45 . The further marketing is not only 
forbidden, products are deemed to be so dangerous that they must be taken 
away from the market under the responsibility of administrative entities. 
Seizure as an instrument of post market control is not as widely spread as a 
product ban. lt has been introduced in the US legislation, in the French 
Product Safety Act, the Dutch Commodity Act and the 1987 amendment of 
the UK Consumer Safety Act. One might even recognize a certain trend 
pointing in direction of extending the post market control instruments to 
"seizure", but i.e. the Gewerbeaufsichtsämter in the FRG are not entitled to 
seize a dangerous product. They may only issue a prohibition order under 
the Gerätesicherheitsgesetz. 
"Recall" is certainly the most ideologically laden instrument of post 
market control. lt is the only instrument which allows for the withdrawal of 
unsafe products from the market. Recall only guarantees that the <langer 
resulting from unsafe products is eliminated. The United States has been 
43 Cf. Il.l.b. 
44 Cf. like in the UK, G. Brüggemeier, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 113. 
45 In the US, seizure concems a specific procedure not only a specific kind of action, Ch. 
Joerges, 2.2.1.2.1. 
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the forerunner in introducing recall already in 1972 in the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, France followed in 1983, Australia in 1986 and Sweden in 
1989. Recall has no consistent meaning. That is why the regulatory concepts 
differ considerably46• For the moment it suffices to point out the efforts of 
countries which have not (yet) introduced product recall to find regulatory 
mechanisms, which represent a less stringent intervention in the market 
than recall, but come near to product recall in their effects. Reference may 
be made to the UK and the Dutch legislation. The 1978 UK Act provides 
for a "notice to warn" requiring the distributor of the dangerous product to 
notify his purchasers of its dangerous qualilty. The Netherlands have dis-
cussed the introduction of product recall in the recent revision of the 
Commodity Act in 1988, but finally decided to copy the UK model. But un-
like the UK Act, the Minister can decide to publish the warning himseu47, if 
the distributor fails to do so. Warning the public is seen as an equivalent to 
product recall. 
b. Differentation of post market control mechanisms, ranking of risks, nonnal 
and emergency procedures 
lt is a common characteristic of developed regulatory concepts of 
product safety legislation that they differentiate the procedures which are 
set into motion once a danger to the consumer arises. The technique ap-
plied is the ranking of risks: 
the US Consumer Saf ety Act makes a distinction between 
"unreasonahle risk of injury", "imminent hazard" and "substantial prod-
uct hazard1148 , 
the Australian Trade Practices Act between "goods that may cause 
injury to any person" and "requirements of a ;~andard that must be 
resonably necessary to prevent or reduce a risk' , 
the French Loi sur la Securite des Consommateurs between "les pro-
duits ne satisfaisant pas a l'obligation generale de securite" and the 
measures tobe taken ''en cas de <langer grave et immediat". 
The other investigated countries have not explicitly laid down different 
concepts of risks, though some form of differentiation exists. The UK Con-
sumer Product Safety Act distinguishes between the normal safety require-
ments, from those emergency situations, without defining what might be 
46 Cf. for more details under d. 
47 G.F.M. Snijders, in: Ch. Joerges (ed), loc.cit., 103. 
48 Cf. Ch. Joerges, 2.2.1.1. 
49 Cf. D. Harland, 45. 
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understood as "emergency"50• The new Swedish Product Safety Act endows 
the Consumer Ombudsman both power to issue a prohibiton order or an 
order to disclose information "in minor cases". The German Gerätesicher-
heitsgesetz leaves it "normally" to the discretion of the Gewerbeauf-
sichtämter whether they decide to take action or not but oblige the author-
ities to examine intervention in cases of acute danger.51. 
The regulatory concept, despite the differences in terminology seems 
to be identical: ranking of risks should make clear that there are different 
degrees of intensity of dangers requiring different kind of action. "Normal" 
risks are separated from "emergency" risks, normal risks require a proce-
dure of post market control which differs from the emergency procedure. 
The two procedures are spelt out to a different degree52. The characteris-
tics of the two procedures are often not clearly shaped but must be deduced 
from the regulatory concept as such. Having said this, normal and emer-
gency procedures might be distinguished under two aspects: (1) Questions 
of competence and (2) Questions of instruments. 
(1) The competent authority endowed to take action in normal situa-
tions is not necessarily the same in emergency situations53. This is particu-
larly true for countries like the US where the application of the law is put in 
the hands of an independant regulatory agency, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission. This very same ageny is bound to a specific procedure 
"seizure" - in cases where there is an "imminent hazard". The agency has to 
approach the competent District Court if it intends to take action against 
unsafe products. The spectrum of remedies at the Court's disposition 
ranges from the seizure of the product, the ordering of cautionary informa-
tion directed to consumers, the ordering of a public notice or of even the 
recall of the product54• French law has not gone as far as US law, and has 
stayed away from establishing a Commission pour la Securite des Consom-
mateurs with broad regulatory competence. The responsibility for taking 
action has always therefore remained in the hands of the ministerial bu-
50 G. Brüggemeier, in: Ch. Joerges et al„ loc. cit. 112, with referei:ice to the ad<;>ption of an 
prohibiuon order i!l case of an emer~ency. On~ might also ra!se the que~t1on whether 
the suspension nottce must be regaroed as an mstrument wh1ch appl1es m emergency 
situations only. 
51 Cf. § 5, para 2 of the Gerätesicherheitsgesetz, thereto J. Falke, loc. cit. under 5.2. 
52 They are weil devefoped in France i.e. cf. H.-W. Micklitz, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 
75 et seq. 
53 Australia and the UK do not make any difference in the distribution of competences in 
normal and emergency procedures. In the UK the Secretary of States remains responsi-
ble for both procedures, in Australia it is the !"finister. There is a differenc<: ~owever be-
tween the drafting of regulations by the parhamenta:zy counsel. and the MmLSter's com-
petence to publish in the Commonwealth Gazette a declaratton that a standard os a 
consumer standard for the purpose of s. 65 C, D. Harland, 4.4. 
54 Ch. Joerges et al., 2.1.2.1. 
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reaucracy. But even here the differences are striking. Actions to be taken 
within the normal procedure follow the legislatory machinery applicable to 
the rules on the adoption of a regulation (<leeret). In emergency situations, 
the action is taken by the rninistry responsible for the protection of con-
sumers directly (arrete). The Swedish Product Safety Act entrusts the Om-
budsman with the management of minor cases. Emergency cases, however, 
have to be settled at the Market Court. 
(2) Differentiation in the procedures to be followed goes together with 
differentiation of re~ulatory instruments. Such an approach is particularly 
developed in France 5, where the set of instruments available to the com-
petent authorities differs considerably according to the procedure con-
cerned. The other investigated countries reserve specific far-reaching in-
struments to emergency situations. Australia empowers the Minister to de-
clare, by a notice published in the Commonwealth Gazette, the goods to be 
unsafe in order to fight an emerging <langer. The UK has recently intro-
duced an amendment to the Safety Act entitling trading officers to issue a 
suspension notice. The background for the extension of powers has been 
the Jack of flexible and quick regulatory instruments56. The US "seizure" 
procedure applies only where there is an imminent hazard. The Nether-
lands allow for the confiscation of the product if the public prosecutor has 
been involved by the Keuringdienst van Waren. One characteristic of emer-
gency-related instruments of post market control is their prelirninary char-
acter. Measures may be upheld beyond the legally defined expiry date but 
must then undergo the procedure normally provided for post market con-
trol action. This entails two consequences: the instruments change their 
character, the notice is transposed into a banning order i.e. those who are 
concerned by the regulatory action have to be heard before the permanent 
action is taken57. 
Competences and instruments differ in normal and emergency proce-
dures. However, there seems to be an underlying common principle. Insti-
tutionally independent entities are endowed with a lirnited set of legal in-
struments only. The stronger the intervention into the market, the higher 
the procedural requirements. Competences are delegated away from the 
independant institutions either to Courts - in the US and in Sweden - or 
are concentrated in the hands of the ministries. The most striking and most 
consistent mechanism can be found in Australia. Here post market control 
management lies principally in the hands of the manufacturers themselves. 
55 Cf. M.-Ch. He!oire, p. 15 alt. 
56 G. Brüggemeier, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 112 et seq. 
57 Cf. for more details on the right to be heard of the parties concemed,II.3.c. 
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Statutory control entities come into play only if the manufacturer fails to 
take sufficient action. Similar thinking may be reported from the Nether-
lands where the Keuringdienst van Waren may state in its official report 
that the producer was unwilling to cooperate, a statement which seems to 
be more or less preconditioning for taking further action58• 
c. The recall procedure 
The intention here is to summarize the different regulatory concepts of 
post market control and to concentrate them in the way through which 
product recall is regulated. The overview should serve at the same time as a 
pattem for tbe presentation of administrative practice. lt has to be recalled: 
that there are central instances in the US (Consumer Product Safety 
Commission), France (Commission pour la Securite des Consomma-
teurs), Australia (Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs) and Sweden 
(National Board for Consumer Policies) and decentralised units in the 
UK (Trading officers), the Netherlands (Keuringdienst van Waren) 
and the FRG (Gewerbeaufsichtsämter). Here central entities might 
exist but they have no competence beyond informing the public in 
emergency situations. 
Where there is specific recall legislation like in the US, Australia and 
Sweden, recall is bound to a certain degree of <langer - "substantial 
product hazard", "prevent or reduce risk or injury", "risk of personal 
injury''. Otherwise the recall procedure cannot be set in motion. 
Countries without recall legislation have not laid down entry rules to 
use their influence to bring voluntary recall about. The last resort in-
strument, the "public notice" is contingent upon emergency situations. 
What remains to be described is the management of product recall as 
provided for by the different legislations: 
(1) Notification provides the competent administrative entities with 
information on risk and risk situations. But only the United States and 
Australia have imposed information duties on manufacturers. The Ameri-
can manufacturer has to notify any irregularity he has heard of. Clearly 
stated: he has to notify even incidents in which it is not yet clear whether a 
<langer for consumers exists. Australian manufacturers have to approach 
the Fedral Bureau of Consumer Affairs only if they are initiating voluntary 
product withdrawal. This is all the more surprising as notifications are a 
precondition for the workability of the Australian post market control sys-
58 B.M. Hummels/G.M.F. Snijders, 5.2. 
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tem. The Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs main task is to monitor the 
effectiveness of voluntary recall in consultation with the supplier59• 
Notification duties of traditional control authorities and courts to in-
stitutionally independant product safety control entities exist in France only. 
Here control authorities endowed with the examination of complicance 
(Direction des Fraudes et Falsifications) have to notify "irregularities" to the 
Commission de la Securite des Consommateurs. The same holds true for 
the French Courts involved in product liability litigation or penal proceed-
ings. 
(2) Before the competent administrative entities decide to take a final 
action to fight the <langer which has arisen from an unsafe product, they are 
obliged to initiate an "administrative hearing". This is more or Iess true for 
all investigated countries. But there are differences to be reported in the 
exact shaping of the hearing, mainly as to the question of who should be 
admitted to participate. If action is under consideration which is directed 
against individual suppliers or manufacturers, it goes without saying that 
these have to be heard before the administrative bodies. lt seems to be 
widely accepted that representatives of supplier or manufacturer associa-
tions who might be or feel concerned are likewise admitted. But there is no 
agreement on the participation of consum.ers or consum.er organisations60• 
Consumers remain locked out by two exceptions: the US administrative 
hearing led by the Consumer Product Saf ety Commission is open to non-
concerned consumers and consumer organisations. The same is true for 
France where the Commission pour la Securite des Consommateurs is plu-
ralistically composed. Access for Consumer organisations to the activities of 
the Commission is guaranteed. 
(3) Based on the information received and after having heard the ar-
guments of the parties concerned, the competent administrative entities 
must consider the spectrum of reactions. A very first reaction is notifying 
the danger. The instrument can be found in all countries, though the termi-
nology is - once more - not consistent. lt is exercised in a double step 
procedure. First, the competent entities order the manufacturer and the 
supplier to inf orm the consumer on the existence of a risk. Then, if the dan-
ger so requires, the competent entities issue a "public notice". There are 
countries who have finely tuned the necessary instruments, like the United 
States, Australia, the Netherlands, France or Sweden. There are other 
countries like the FRG and the UK where "notification" as a regulatory in-
59 D.Harland, 6.11. 
60 Tobe clear, we _arc talking of particpation in administrative decision not of particpation 
in the elaboratton of a Standard within private standard setting institutions or in the 
legislative machinery provided for the ela6oration of regulations. 
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strument is not spelt out, the existence of such an instrument must be de-
duced from other regulatory mechanisms61• And once more it must be re-
called that there are few countries which only allow explicitly for a "public 
notice" - the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Australia, France 
and Sweden. The shift from the notification of the manufacturers or suppli-
ers to the public notice is often bound with a re-delegation of competence 
from the newly established control entities back to the Ministries62· 
(4) There are further means of reaction, mainly the recall of the prod-
uct in the US, Australia, France and Sweden. Recall comprises a whole set 
of regulatory mechanisms, repair, refund, replacement. In the US, perfor-
mance of the recall procedure remains in the hands of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission, in Australia it is the Federal Bureau of Consumer 
Affairs who supervises the voluntary recalls of the manufacturers but it is 
the Minister who takes action. Such a shift of competence must be reported 
from France and from Sweden. All steps preparing a recall procedure re-
main in the hands of the Commission pour la Securite des Consommateurs, 
the National Board for Consumer Policies respectively. But mandatory re-
call action requires in France the engagement either of the Minister or of 
the legislatory machinery, and in Sweden the involvement of the Market 
Court. 
The UK, the Netherlands and the FRG might refer to a "ban" in order 
to exercise impact on the manufacturer or supplier, but to repeat it bluntly, 
there is no regulatory means to oblige the manufacturers or any other party 
to recall unsaf e products. 
(5) If the competent administrative entities have taken legally binding 
action, be it in form of a notification or be it in form of a recall order or a 
ban, contravention is a criminal offence. Courts might be approached to 
implement binding orders and to condemn the wrongdoers to fines or even 
imprisonment. 
61 
62 
Cf. for the FRG, J. Falke, Ioc. cit. 5.2. "andere Maßnahi:ien• i.S. des§ 5 Abs. 2 are notifi-
cation orders addressed to the manufacturers or the 1mporters; for the UK reference 
should be made to the suspension notice whose issuance pres~J?P.Oses the attempt to 
regulate the risk by way of less stringent measures than the proh1b1t1on order. 
Cf. as an example the new mechanism under the Dutch 1988 Warenwet, G.M.F. Sni-
jders, in: Ch. Joerges (ed.), loc. cit. 102 et seq. 
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III. Practice of Post Market Control 
The perspective taken in the presentation is one of the competent reg-
ulatory body. lt has first to make the concept of safety operable for the im-
plementation process, it has then to investigate arising dangers, before it 
enters into the decison-making process. Consideration on the effectiveness 
of actual practice of post rnarket control concludes the chapter. 
1. Tue definition of risk 
The regulatory concepts remain vague even if they try to spell out dif-
fering degrees of <langer. The competent authorities are therefore chal-
lenged with the task to use the given regulatory process as a means of risk 
assessment. Test cases might be an appropriate means to receive assistence 
from the courts in the understanding of the legislatory risk concept. Initiat-
ing test cases presupposes the legal capacity of the control authorities to 
bring litigation before the courts, and the political intention to fight a con-
flict through. There are only a few examples to be reported. The National 
Highway Traffic Administration (NHTSA) had a dispute with General 
Motors on whether or not the normally foreseeable misuse rnight be con-
sidered in the deterrnination of risks63. The competent Australian ministry 
and a manufacturer of tobacco products are quarrelling on the roeaning of 
"injury'' on the one band and "disease" on the other64. 
lt cannot be surprising that the competent authorities are looking for 
further criteria of orientation. The most ambitious effort made so far, has 
been undertaken by the US Consumer Product Saf ety Commission. The 
"Substantial Product Hazard Reports" of 7.08.1978 seeks to present an au-
toritative clarification of the term "substantial product hazard"65. There is 
no quivalent in all other ivestigated countries. If any, reference rnight be 
made to the German "DIN 31000" which formulates an overall regulatory 
philosophy for the elaboration of technical standards. But the standard DIN 
31000 is not destined to solve the practical problems of an authority in han-
dling the safety concept of the German Gerätesicherheitsgesetz66. 
The difference between the authorities involved in the process of 
defining the safety concept is indicative. The US Consumer Product Safety 
Comrnission tries to keep the definition power in its own hands, in order to 
63 Ch. Joerges, 2.1.2.1. 
64 D. Harland, 8.23. 
65 The implications are investigated in detail in Ch. Joerges, 2.3.1. 
66 At least not as a general means, but in exceptional cases DIN 31000 may serve as a yard-
stick, J. Falke, German Version, 5.1. 
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have a self determined basis for exercising post market control. The shift 
from the "seizure" procedure to the recall mechanism underlines the inten-
tion of the US Commission to safeguard institutional independency67. For 
the German Gewerbeaufsichtsämter independence is not and cannot be an 
ojective. The linkage between the defini.tion of safety and the kind of im-
plementation is even part of the regulatory concept. German Gewerbeauf-
sichtsämter proceed from compliance of the products with technical stan-
dards if this is documented by a specific certification mark. They are not 
bound to the level determined within the standards, but these standards 
provide substantial assistance in defining what should be understood by a 
safe product. The sarne stringent relationship can be found in the Nether-
Iands where the Keuringdienste are "bound" to the certification of 
KEMA 68• Nowhere else, however, have standards such an overwhelming 
role to play. They might be used as an orientation mark, but present prac-
tice may be characterized by a certain reluctance towards this. 
The situation in France is exemplary for such a distant attitude. Here, 
the Commission de Ia Securite des Consommateurs holds the power of 
defining risk at least as far as it has got regulatory competence. lt is true, 
the Commission is not the only competent organization to implement 
French product safety law, it can do so only in accordance with the ordinary 
control authorities competence for the implementation of the frame law of 
1905. The Commission, however, remains autonomous. Technical standards 
elaborated by the French standardization organization AFNOR, provide as-
sistance for risk assessment. But the Commission often determines the level 
of safety beyond the technical standards69. 
Cost benefit analysis has been promoted as a means to put the risk as-
sessment on a rational basis. Although the regulatory concepts are not con-
sistent, one might proceed from the assumption that some kind of cost ben-
efit analysis is made within all competent authorities. But the National 
Swedish Board for Consumer Policies's tremendous effort to apply 
cost/benefit analysis on the saf ety of ski bindings has remained an excep-
tion 70. Cast benefit analysis is usually excercised at a lower level, in tbe 
form of weighing differing aspects rather than in engaging professional ad-
vice. 
67 Ch. Joerges, 2. 
68 G.M.F. Snijders, Produktveiligheid en aansprakelijkheid, 1987, 97 et seq. 
69 H.-W. Micklitz, in: Ch. Joerges et al„ loc. cit. 70. 
70 N. Ringstedt, 5.4.3. 
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2. Investigation of danger 
On precisely this issue, scientific tendencies clash with "provincialism". 
The positions taken are clearly defined and ideologically overloaded. Prac-
tice is determined to a !arge extent by the regulatory concept on how the in-
vestigation of dangers should best be managed. Quite generally one roight 
conclude that the broader the sources of information on which the control 
authorities can base investigation of the danger, the better they are arrned 
with a professional risk managernent. Such a perspective entails the neces-
sity to continue the presentation of actual practice with conceptual consid-
erations on the function of data collection for post market control. 
a. Accident surveillance systems 
Accident surveillance systerns form the core of product safety infor-
mation policies all over the industrialized countries with one exception, 
namely the FRG 71 • lt has adopted the representative interview from the 
European Community at some six-fold expense. The German position is 
hard to understand and defies logical explanation. Its objection, however, is 
still worth maintaining, because the FRG prevents the Community from 
setting up a Community wide accident surveillance system72• This system 
has a key role to play in the furtherance of product safety policy. Accident 
surveillance systems, this should be recalled, initiate a process of scientifi-
cation of risk assessment73. Measuring risk is no longer based on anecdotal 
evidence or experience knowledge but on data which is systematically col-
lected and evaluated. The process of "scientification" is accompanied by a 
process of politicization. The management of accident surveillance systems 
is put in the hands of persons other than technicians. The resistance of the 
FRG seems to be directed against the intended shift of competence from 
technicians to experts in other fields, it might likewise challenge the well 
established cooperation between the German standard setting organisations 
and the Gewerbeaufsichtsämter. 
Accident surveillance systems represent an instrument of social policy. 
They indicate areas of risks, they do not necessarily supply product-related 
data. The American example of the ATV cars might serve as an example 
for underlining the importance of accident surveillance systems in prac-
tice 74. But, accident surveillance systems can only serve as a starting point 
71 J. Falke, 3. 
72 J. Falke, in: Ch. Joerges et al., Joc. cit. 289 et seq. 
73 Ch. Joerges et al., Joc. cit. 42 et seq. 
74 Ch. Joerges, 2.4.2. 
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for futher in-depth investigation and evaluation of possible product risks. 
Without the necessary resources and the institutional frame required to 
make use of the accident surveillance systems in practice, the data collected 
might remain dormant. And that seems to be all to often the case. The 
British CSU who is in charge of the HASS system, is only a policy body, it is 
not a central administrative authority and it lacks the ressources to under-
take in-depth investigation. The situation is somewhat more encouraging in 
the Netherlands, where the accident surveillance system legitimates the ac-
tivities of the Dutch Consumer Safety Institute. The erection of an accident 
surveillance system in Sweden might increase the importance of the Na-
tional Swedish Board for Consumer Policies in the long run. Accident 
surveillance systems are all to often administratively separated from the 
competent regulatory authorities. The opposite solution would be required 
in order to increase their importance: integration instead of separation. 
b. Notification duties of manufacturers, traditional control 
authorities and courts 
The differing starting point of the US and the Australian notification 
duties of manufacturers does not play a substantial role. Australian manu-
facturers tend to notify all kinds of incidents even if they do not come under 
the formal notification duty. They behave just like their American counter-
parts. Although legally binding notification duties have led to a consider-
able increase of notifications in both countries, critiques of the American 
system claim that 10% of all relevant incidents are notified at best 75. The 
reluctance of American manufacturers might be explained by the legal con-
sequences resulting from a possible infringement of the notification duty. 
Consumers might feel invited to sue manufacturers for not having notified 
incidents early enough and claim compensation for damages under product 
liability rules. Australian consumer organisations have pointed out the key 
role of the notification for the workability of the whole Australian recall 
procedure. They fear that the delay resulting from the notification of recall 
only instead of risk situations hinders the implementation of the product 
safety legislation. The persistent engagement of the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission to implement the notification duties of manufacturers 
seems to confirm such an understanding76 
The notification duties of French traditional control authorities and 
courts meet some difficulties in practice. Both are quite reluctant to pursue 
their notification duty. The Commission de la Securite des Consommateurs 
75 Ch. Joerges, 2.3.2.3. 
76 Ch. Joerges, 2.3.2.3. 
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has taken measures to increase confidence in its regulatory activities in or-
der to effectuate the notification duty77. Other countries have set up more 
or less weil established forms of cooperation between the traditional au-
thorities cornpetent for examining cornpliance and the special control enti-
ties endowed with risk assessment. Cooperation, however, has a different 
function to fulfill here, namely to parantee the exchange of information 
between different regulatory levels7 • Certification bodies might as weil be-
come the addressees of notification duties as in the FRG where 
certification bodies have to inform the Gewerbeaufsichtsämter of all kinds 
of incidents and irregularities 79. 
c. Other sources of inf ormation 
Individual consumer complaints seem to play a key role in nearly all 
countries. This is even true for the American Consumer Product Safety 
Comrnission which aggregates its data on an accident surveillance system 
and which can base its activities on the notification of manufacturers. The 
overwhelming importance of individual consumer complaints is very weil 
documented in France80• A specific hot line, indicating to consumers that 
the competent authority is available at any time seems to be extremely effi-
cient. Only a limited number of control activities may be allocated to notifi-
cations by manufacturers or to data collection accident surveillance 
systems. Only five of the 25 most aggravating recalls have been triggered by 
the American Consumer Product Safety Comrnission81• Moreover, there 
are quite heterogeneous sources of information to be kept in mind, such as 
testing groups, certification bodies or insurance companies. The role and 
importance of these inf ormation bearers is difficult to evaluate. The accu-
mulated knowledge seems to get lost or is intentionally ( or again, uninten-
tionally?) not transmiued to the competent control entities. The prospective 
role of consumer organizations and certification bodies needs to be further 
explored82. 
77 Personal infonnation from R. Loosli, Comrnission pour Ja Securite des 
Consommateurs. 
78 Cf. under V.1., 2. 
79 Cf. for further details under IV.2. 
80 Cf. the annual reports of the Commission pour Ja Securite des Consommateurs. 
81 Ch. Joerges, 2.3.2. 
82 Chapter II, cf. III. 
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3. The process of decision-making 
The analysis is restricted to administrative decision making, because 
state induced recall activities seem to represent the overwhelming percent-
age of all post market control activities. Agreements between consumers 
and manufacturers might be concluded, like in the Netherlands where the 
Konsumentenbond is involved in private arrangements83• The engagement 
of the Dutch Consumer Safety Institute should be regarded as a statutory 
activity. The process of administrative decision-making shall be presented 
in a twofold perspective: The elaboration of the criteria for decision-making 
and for defming priorities seeks to illuminate common denominators of 
administrative practice, against which the different regulatory mechanisms 
of control are then analysed. 
a. Criteria of decision-making- constraints to cooperation 
Our analysis focusses an factors which explicitly or implicitly deter-
mine the process of decision-making as well as the prejudice 
(Selbstverständnis= Self-image?) of the control agencies in the perfor-
mance of their duties. The loss of certainty resulting from vague legal safety 
concepts puts pressure on the authorities to cooperate with the potential 
addressees of the negotiations. Since the control authorities are involved in 
a constant process of making value judgments, possible decisions are always 
debatable. But it is not the lass of certainty alone which urges the control 
authorities to look for mutual agreements with the parties concerned. Apart 
from the United States, statutory control authorities may be sued with com-
pensation claims if they have made improper decisions. Nobody knows 
whether the risk exists in reality, as precedents are missing. lt might not be 
excluded, however, that the potentiality suffices to influence the behaviour 
of the control authorities. Manufacturers, for obvious reasons, prefer to 
enter into negotiations with the control authorities. Two express grounds 
may be identified: 
1. Manufacturers feel jeopardized by a formal administrative procedure 
which is open to the public at !arge and might violate their image; 
2. Manufacturers try to avoid possible product liability claims by taking 
appropriate measures in good time. This might be a central motive in 
the United States, but it is also true to a lesser extent in France, the 
UK and the FRG. 
Such a mutual approach complies best with the way the employees of 
the control agencies see themselves. They are prepared to engage their ex-
83 B.M. Hummels/G.M.F. Snijders, 4.2. 
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pertise in order to achieve the most effective solution, almost in a consulta-
tive role to the manufacturer. The employees change their position how-
ever, if the manufacturers refuse to take the necessary measures. They then 
slip into the role of regulators84• 
b. Defining priorities of post market control action 
Statutory control agencies can restrict their activities to examine 
whether the product complies with mandatory or quasi mandatory safety 
rules. They might be entitled as well to evaluate risks, to determine the level 
of safety, and then to take measures against manufacturers. Control agen-
cies however are not completely free to decide what to do. Local authorities 
are mainly in charge of examining compliance. The newly established spe-
cial control entities are concerned alternatively with the determination of 
the level of safety85. 
Control authorities, no matter how different their financial and per-
sonal input might be, have always scanty resources to administer. They have 
to set priorities in their work. Countries disposing of an accident surveil-
lance system will use the data collected as a starting point for initiating pri-
ority activities. Country-specific sensitivity towards particular product 
groups or groups of persons is another incentive for setting priorities. The 
National Swedish Board for Consumer Policies is engaged with ski and 
skating equipment86. Australia and Sweden deploy an overwhelming en-
gagement in the risks children encounter in daily life87. Dutch and British 
control activities center on risks resulting from all kinds of electrical heating 
equipment. German control authorities start from the principle of "selective 
supervision"88. The Gewerbeaufsichtsämter employ their scanty resources 
to control fairs examining whether (imported) products to be brought onto 
the German market meet German safety standards. Systematic market in-
vestigations, triggered by "notifications" (from whatever source) or by expe-
rience knowledge of the employees, lead to the best result. 
Defining priorities does not only mean marking the field of activity 
(compliance or determination of safety) and to engage in in-depth investi-
gations. Defining priorities involves most of all, the necessity to diff erentiate 
between already known risks and to concentrate on cases which are espe-
cially severe and far-reaching. Such a differentation allows for setting prior-
84 Cf. G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 6 (III) (iii). 
85 Cf. II 1 a. 
86 N. Ringstedt, 5.4.3. 
87 N. Ringstedt, 5.7.; D. Harland, 8.6. 
88 J. Falke, Gennan Version, 5.1. 
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ities where action must be taken first and it must be appropriate in 
response to the danger in question. Scientific and professionalized 
paramet~rs of decision-making are transparent and can be challenged by 
the public at large. The Consumer Product Safety Commission alone has 
translated the different ?ara?1eters of decision-makin)?; into a classification 
scheme. lt ranges the nsks mto groups from A to <::'9• The classification 
then entails priority setting. According to the group different post market 
control measures are to be taken. The already developed Australian90 and 
the envisaged Dutch classification scheme91 point to the same direction. 
c. Infonnal dispute settlement and formal regulatory action 
Informal dispute settlement represents the most important mechanism 
of post market control activities. There are no statistics available, indicating 
the relationship between informal dispute settlement and formal adminis-
trative action. lt seems not overestimated, however to consider informal 
mechanisms as representing more than 90% of all administratively induced 
control activities. 
Conclusions on the kind of arrangements negotiated between the au-
thorities and the manufacturers can be based on anecdotal evidence only. 
One might proceed from the assumption that below the formal administra-
tive procedure, all those regulatory measures are to be found which belong 
to the traditional inventory of post market control measures. The availabil-
ity of regulatory instruments determines the negotiation. Differentiated so-
lutions are difficult to imagine in countries where legal recall mechanisms 
are not available. But informal dispute settlement seems to be much more 
flexible than legal solution patterns. Product recalls can be found in all 
countries notwithstanding the fact that only the United States, Australia 
and Sweden have explicitly anchored the recall of products in their product 
safety laws. 
lt is difficult to ascertain the factors determining the style of negotia-
tion. Experience seems to indicate that the course of negotiations complies 
best with everyday theory. Economic power and the size of an undertaking 
seem to be the most important denominators for the course of negotiations. 
Much more concrete results might be reported from thefonn of the dispute 
settlement patterns, especially in countries where the kind of action to be 
taken is bound to the classification of dangers, like in the US and Australia. 
89 Cf. Ch. Joerges, 2.3.3.1. 
90 D. Harland, 6.4. 
91 B.M. Hummels/G.M.F. Snijders, 2.2.1. 
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The Consumer Product Safety Commission is operating with so-called cor-
rective action plans or, if necessary, with consent orders92• The Australian 
FBCA has developed guidelines on the implementation of recall activities, 
which are made available to the manufacturers93. In the UK, the FRG and 
the Netherlands a formalized and professional management of recall activi-
ties is still lacking. This might e~lain the failure of a recall action on elec-
trical blankets in the Netherlands 4, and the rather delayed execution of the 
recall of unsafe office chairs in the FR G 95• 
The all-embracing character of informal dispute settlement should not 
lead to the conclusion that contentious procedures and formal decision-
taking has no function any langer in the administrative practice. All control 
authorities share the common conviction to use formal administrative pro-
cedures as a last resort only. This might explain why there are so few formal 
regulatory actions to be reported from the different countries. The hurdles 
erected by the legislators should not be overestimated in that respect. On 
the other hand it should be recalled that only Sweden and the United States 
provide for a regulatory mechanism which allows a flexible shift from the 
measures the Consumer Product Safety Commission or the National Board 
for Consumer Policies (the Consumer Ombudsman) are endowed to take, 
which presuppose the involvment of the District Court (in the US) or the 
Market Court (in Sweden). So, the function of formal regulatory action 
here is to secure the implementation of informal agreements by way of 
formal action. 
But, in practice legal instruments are mostly exercised in order to urge 
the addressees to take voluntary corrective actions - as a mere coercive 
power. The availability of differentiated rules as weil as the capacity to make 
use of them, is preconditioning for the workability of regulatory means as a 
coercive power. Availability concerns the set of instruments given to the 
competent authorities, availability is a plea for further extension of post 
market control instruments. Making use of the instruments to demonstrate 
their existence safeguards the respect control entities must benefit of in day 
to day practice. 
Highly professionalized product safety control entities know that they 
are obliged to make use of their legal armament in order to be taken seri-
ously. That is why the Australian Trade Practices Commission initiates liti-
gations as part of its policy, the same is true for the US Consumer Product 
92 Ch. Joerges, 2.3.3.2. 
93 D. Harland, 6.17. 
94 B.M. Hummels/G.M.F. Snijders, 6.1. 
95 J. Falke, German Version, 5.3. 
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Safety Commission and the Swedish Board for Consumer Policies96• If the 
control entities refrain from using the legal mechanisms which are at their 
disposal against manuf acturers, dealers or importers, their function as an 
administrative body endowed to take mandatory action is jeopardized. The 
German Gewerbeaufsichtsämter seem to have reached the thresholct97• 
d. Promoting new standards 
One proven means for the control authorities to fight the existence of 
unsafe products might be a request to the competent entities/ministerial bu-
reaucracies to elaborate new technical standards or adopt safety regula-
tions, which define minimum requirements on the manufacturing of specific 
products. lt is emphatically stated that standard setting does not belong to 
post market control regulation. lt seems nevertheless to work quite suc-
cessfully in Australia and Sweden. The difference between pre market and 
post market control activities is thereby loosing importance98. New stan-
dards are used at the same time to respond to risk situations (preparing ap-
propriate post market control measures) and to formulate prospective re-
quirements for the manufacturing and marketing of products. This option 
exists everywhere. How it is managed depend to a large extent on the regu-
latory approach chosen. Standard setting is part of the statutory responsib-
lity in countries where agencies/adminstrative entities within the ministerial 
bureaucracies are entitled to adopt mandatory safety standards and regula-
tions. The overall tendency points to the opposite direction. Private stan-
dard-setting bodies become more and more involved in the elaboration of 
new saf ety standards. The shift of competences casts some doubt on the 
perspectives of promoting new standard setting as a means of post market 
control99. 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Litigation then concern basic questions of the notion of risk, cf. III.1. The ~ustralia!1 
Trade Practices Commission clearly states : "best use of resou!c~s, b<;>th pubhc and_pn-
vate, requires that most compliance work be done at an adm1.mstrat1ve !evel, pro",!ded 
that the credibility of the Act is demonstrated by coun procedmgs, when necessaty , D. 
Harland, 9.7. 
J. Falke, Gennan Version,5.2. 
This conclusion is underlined by D. Harland, 7. 
Elaboration of standards is often delar.ed, it's complicated procedure does not allow for 
quick action. The Australian Ministers competence to declare a voluntaiy standard by 
the Standards Association of Australia to be consumer Standard presupposes that there 
is an appropriate standard available, cf. D. Harland, 4.4. 
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e. Compliance 
Compliance presupposes that there are mandatory standards to be 
pursued by the manufacturers and agencies which ensure its execution. The 
importance of compliance activities is difficult to assess. Differing regula-
tory approaches play a considerable role. Countries relying on penal sanc-
tion models often restrict their implementation activities to the execution of 
compliance. Countries having submitted saf ety regulation to market prac-
tices legislation, like Sweden, the US and Australia, use com~liance activi-
ties to clean up the market of unsafe non-compliant products 00. Australia, 
and this seems to be quite particular, employs Federal compliance activities 
to "harmonize" differing control activities at the state level. Compliance 
here gains an integrative function101• 
Penal prosecution of mandatory standards/post market control mea-
sures is handled very cautiously. Not each and every violation is pursued102. 
Only unyielding manufacturers are sanctioned. Negligence is required even 
where it is not formally necessary (the UK)103. The parallel drawn to the 
prosecution of possible infringements of market practices legislation shows 
that infringements against product safety law are sanctioned much more 
strictly than infringements of the market practices law. This being so in the 
UK, but quite the opposite is true for Australia104• 
The most important means to ensure compliance in practice seems not 
to be penal prosecution but rather injunction orders. British and Swedish 
control authorities are endowed with the capacity to pursue obvious in-
fringements against safety Standards or post market control actions by way 
of injunction orders105• Injunction orders threaten the addressee with penal 
sanctions, they do not already contain penal sanctions or even fines. Injunc-
tion orders postpone penal prosecution. 
100 D. Harland, 5.5.-5.6„ N. Ringstedt, 5.6.3. 
101 D. Harland, 5.5.-5.6. 
102 D. Harland, 9.6. 
103 G. Woddroffe/St. Weatherill, 6. (III) (iii) (a). 
104 G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 6. (III) (iii); D. Harland, 9.9. 
105 D. Harland, 9.9. 
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4. Efficiency ofpost market control 
There are yardsticks available to measure the efficiency of post market 
control activities: 
(1) The repercussion of possible control measures on the quality policy of 
the manufacturer; 
(2) The innovative function of post market control; 
(3) The reaction quota on the part of consumers. 
Statements can be made on points 2 and 3 only and under a further 
considerable restriction. Verifiable investigations are available from the 
United States only and the data is already ten years old. 
Australia and the United States are Operating with differentiated 
statistics on post market control activities. Australia had registered 319 no-
tifications on voluntary recall activities between July 1986 and April 1988106. 
lt does not cover state-induced measures done. The Consumer Product 
Safeft; Commission reports of round about a hundred self-organized activi-
ties1 . Sweden seems to lead the European countries in initiating recall 
procedures 108• 
The US Consumer Product Safety Commission's study on the effi-
ciency of recall activities concentrates on the number of the repaired and 
rendered products109: 
The study evaluated 245 cases until 1976. 39% of all cases had a 
success rate over 90%, whereas the quotas range normally be-
tween 9 and 26%. In order to trace back the denominators of 
these quotas, the study scaled the different product categories. 
Durable goods (television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, 
etc.) had a higher success rate, over 70%, whereas the smaller 
electrical appliances achieved only a quota of 12%. The. next step 
has been to identify six variables, showing a strong relat1on to the 
quota of recall: price, durability, number of markete? products, 
date of marketing (age of product), percentage of dehvery to the 
consumer nature of the measures taken (form of notification, Io-
cus of repair). The result of the e~aluation is ran&e~. on a scale 
demonstrating the success perspectlves of recall act1V1hes: 
cases, concerning more than 100.000 units of low value 
(under 2$) and low durability (less than 2 years) where 
106 D. Harland, 5.9. 
107 Ch. Joerges, 2.3.4. 
108 N. Ringstedt, 5.7. 
109 Cf. Ch. Joerges, 2.3.4. 
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the marketing period covered already five years, had 
the warst success perspectives; 
a success rate under 50% may be calculated in cases 
where the products cost 25$, had a durability of less 
than 6 months, a marketing period of 18 months and a 
delivery rate to the consumer of more than 66%, if only 
10.000 units were concerned; 
a high success quota of more than 90% could be 
achieved if the users were directly inf ormed and if the 
repair was clone at home. 
However, even these results can.not be taken for granted, as the study 
does not take into consideration the classification of dangers later intro-
duced 110. Moreover, the study sets aside that a recall might be successful if 
the user simply throws the product away or handles it more cautiously. 
Anecdotal evidence and knowledge obtained by experience available in Eu-
rope underlines the result evident in the empirical study by the US Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission. An important initiative has been begun 
in Australia and the UK where the manufacturers are using their guarantee 
systems to carry out recall activities111• The systems allow direct contact 
with the consumer, thereby increasing the potential success rate. 
lt seems to be much more difficult to evaluate the innovative function 
of recall activities than to consider their potential efficiency. New standards 
might be developed due to recall activities, but there is no scientific evi-
dence on the interrelationship112. 
IV. Additional Measures of Post Market Control 
Post market control is primarily subject to statutory responsibility in 
the form of administrative actions. The interrelationship between adminis-
trative control action and product liability should not be forgotten however. 
The FRG underlines the interrelationship between both spheres of respon-
sibility and considers an efficient product liability system to be an equiva-
lent for administrative recall measures. Certification bodies and consumer 
organizations are finally engaged in the implementation of post market 
control. 
110 Cf. Ch. Joerges, 2.3.4. 
111 D. Harland, loc. cit.; G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, Ioc. cit. 
112 Cf. for further details under IV.2 b. 
428 
Comparative Analysis 
1. Product liability - importance for post market controJ 
Product liability in its repercussions on post market control is dis-
cussed under two aspects: 
product monitoring duties as an instrument for removing possible 
dangers, and an independent measure of post market control; 
the possible interdependency between administrative control and pri-
vate liability. 
a. Product monitoring duties 
Liability for product monitoring duties seems to be widely accepted 
now. Monitoring duties are circumscribed as an "extension of the general 
duty of care be~ond the spatial radius of the undertaking from the present 
to the future"11 • Product monitoring duties exist to a relatively developed 
extent in the United States, the FRG and the UK114• Their further devel-
oprnent by the EC Member States seems to be safeguarded as the Product 
Liability Directive has left a Iacuna here115• Product monitoring duties aim 
at the reduction of health hazards to consumers, resulting from the exclu-
sion of development risks in the Directive. Manufacturers should not be Ii-
able if the defect could not be discovered at the time of manufacturing. If 
however, there is some evidence that the product is nevertheless risky, the 
manufacturer must take appropriate post market control measures. Bridg-
ing the regulatory gap left by the Product Liability Directive does not suf-
fice to consider such product monitoring duties as being an independent in-
strument of post market control. Access to the instrument is limited to 
those wbo suffer Ioss or damage attributable to the unsafe product. Trans-
forming product monitoring duties to a generally applicable instrument 
would entail the necessity to give non-concerned individuals and consumer 
organizations the Iegally unenforceable right to claim performance of ap-
propriate post market control activities from the manufacturer. One might 
interpret German case law as being on the way to elaborating the product 
. . d . . f k t t 1116 momtonng ut1es as an mstrument o post mar e con ro 
113 Translation of G. Brüggemeier, Produzentenhaftung nach § ~23 Abs. 1 BGB. Bestand-
saufnahme und Perspektiven weiterer judizieller Rechtsentwicldung, WM 1982, 1294 et 
seq, 1301. 
114 J. Falke, Gerrnan Version, 2; G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 2, (1). 
115 OJ No. L 210, 7.8.1985, 29 et seq. 
116 There is some di.scussion in legal doctrine on opening up the procedure for non-con-
cerned individuals or even group actions, but the courts have not taken on the academ1c 
considerations. 
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b. Interdependency 
Whereas Europe is only beginning to discuss the interdependency 
between statutory post market control measures and private liability, the 
very same subject has already become a special discipline in the United 
States117. Here, questions of evidence and possibilities of manufacture are 
discussed to reject product liability complaints with reference to recall ac-
tivities. One point at stake is the suitability of so-called recall letters as evi-
dence in product liability litigation. What about a consumer who receives a 
recall letter, but continues to use the unsafe product? Is an assumption of 
risk justified or not? Another point at stake are the touchy consequence re-
sulting from notifications made by manuf acturers. They are obliged to 
notify all kind of risks, even those which might not be necessarily relevant 
for product liability matters because the notified risk cannot be regarded as 
a "defect". This has always been the position of the US Consumer Product 
Safety Commission. Administrative decisions of the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, however, may not set a precedence for the manufac-
turer's liability under private law. 
A factual interrelationship in the form of possible pressure on manu-
facturers to enter in negotiations, in order to refute potential product lia-
bility complaints, is supposed to exist but difficult to measure. The control 
authorities are advancing the argument that the manufacturers' willingness 
to negotiate is the greater if product liability law is shaped more explicitly. 
American experience cannot, however, simply be transposed to Europe. 
This factual interdependency should be dealt with very cautiously. The den-
sity of the interdependency is finally contingent u~on the efficiency of 
product liability law especially in the consumer field11 . 
2. Certification bodies and testing organizations - auxiliaries in post 
market control 
Both institutions, although serving different functions within the orga-
nization and administration of product safety law, might play an important 
role within the post market control of consumer goods: 
in their regulatory function to perform post market control measures; 
in their technical capacity to examine technical standards set by the 
manufacturers. 
117 Ch. Joerges, 3. 
118 The issue cannot be delt with here. The impact of product liabilty on consumer protec-
tion has never been evaluated. 
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a. Regulatory functions 
Both institutions are free to inform the public of possible risks and in-
sufficent product saf ety standards. They then become involved in the re-
strictions of civil and constitutional law. The right to information has to be 
weighted against the manufacturer's right to privacy119. So far, only the 
testing institutions are using their capacity to inform the consumer. This is 
clone either by publishing alerts in the test journals or by discrediting unsaf e 
products in the testing itself. The majority of the certification bodies seem 
obliged to inform the competent administrative bodies of incidents found. 
They are aggregating their knowledge either in the type examination 
(Bauartprüfbescheinigung) or within their ordinary compliance activities. 
Sometimes they obtain an insight into the record-keeping of manufacturers 
in order to examine whether the manufacturers have taken adequate mea-
sures in reaction to "peculiarities" within the manufacturing process. These 
control activities correspond to the notification duties imposed on Ameri-
can manufacturers120• 
Both institutions are engaged in the compliance control of statutory-
induced saf ety standards. Consumer organizations might take consumer 
alerts as an incentive to discover whether the products which are subject to 
market restrictions are available on the domestic market121. Certification 
bodies check whether the holders of certification marks respect the docu-
mented requirements. Non-compliance with certification marks is to be re-
ported to the prosecution authorities. Theoretically, non-compliance could 
be fought with the adoption of injunction orders. In practice, such a path 
exists in countries only where product safety Iaw is incorporated in market 
practices legislation. Penal prosecution, provided for in most countries, is 
not, or only to a limited extent, exercised. 
b. Technical capacities of post market control 
Theoretically, technical standards of private standard-setting organi-
zations should not only define the necessary requirements for deeming a 
product safe, but also supplying the criteria for examining whether the 
products concerned comply with the defined technical standards. ~he so-
called test criteria, are definitely throwing light on the safety level bemg de-
119 Cf. N. Reich/H.-W. Micklitz, Joc. cit. 
120 Cf.11.3 c. 
121 Cf. for further details, under IV.2. 
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fined within the design requirements. This overall objective being taken for 
granted, considerable deficiencies have to be reported122• German 
"Prüfstellen" had to realize within their control activities that 20% of the 
technical standards in question do not provide for test criteria. A further 
10% provide for test criteria which are completely outdated. The lack of 
necessary test criteria however, should not lead to the conclusion that the 
safety level between technical standards and test criteria diff ers. Even more 
alarming are the statistics on type examinations. In 60 - 95% of the cases 
investigated manufacturers had to change the product design. Self-certifi-
cation, though favoured by the European Community within the different 
directives based on the New Approach123, is certainly not the right way to 
effectively protect European consumers against health hazards. The overall 
positive role test bodies are playing must be qualified in a double sense: 8% 
of all products notified to the German "Gewerbeaufsichtsämter" bore a cer-
tification mark and the German testing institution is constantly discovering 
products bearing the labet "GS geprüft" (GS tested), though they are in fact 
unsafe. 
There is a considerable difference between the official test institutions 
and the consumer organizations in the way they make use of technical stan-
dards in their daily activities. Consumer organizations are referring to tech-
nical standards elaborated by private Standard-setting bodies as one possi-
ble source of information among others. Consumer testing institutions are 
developing their own lest criteria and quite often they lay down standards 
which go beyond the level defined in the technical standards of private 
standard-setting institutions. This practice has been judicially recognized in 
the FRG124 
The activities of the consumer testing organizations seem to be quite 
efficient125• 90% of the manufacturers being the addressee of the test, 
eliminate the incriminated products from the product tender. The innova-
tive function of post market control is likewise striking. 50% of the manu-
facturers are said to use the test results in order to improve the safety of 
their products; 66% are said to take into account test criteria of the con-
sumer organizations in their product design. Though the input of these or-
ganizations in the standard-setting process seems to be guaranteed 
throughout the industrialized countries, their innovative functions should 
122 The follwoing infonnation is based on J. Falke's intensive research on the activities <:>f 
Gennan "Prüfstellen" and testing institutions. 
123 J. Falke, Elementsofa Horizontal Product Safety Policy for the European Community, 
JCP 12 (1989), 207 et seq. 
124 BGH v. 10.3. 1987, VI ZR 144187, mit Anmerkung N. Reich, VuR 1987, 221 et seq. 
125 J. Falke, Gennan Version, 6. 
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~ot be overest~ated. The remaining competent standard-setting organiza-
tlons are adoptmg better standards only, once the Ievel inherent in the new 
standards has already found its way onto the market. 
3. The specific status of post market control measures on cars 
The car sector is quite different from the sector of technical consumer 
goods. dealt with here. Cars are much more expensive than most technical 
consumer goods. Car owners are relatively easy to identify, either by the 
record-keeping of the manufacturers themselves or by the records of the 
competent national registration authorities. Motor vehicles may be subject 
to a periodic. safety check exercised by specific test institutions, and are 
subject to routine maintenance to a large extent. Consumers are not alone 
in defending their rights. Influential automobile clubs assist them with 
specifically trained personnel in all matters arising from use. Recalls of cars 
therefore have a considerable practical importance. 
a. Legal and institutional framework 
Once more the United States has taken the lead126. Recalls of cars are 
subject to a specific Act whose enforcement is entrusted to a particular 
Federal agency. The UK has not regulated the recall of cars in a single Ieg-
islatory act. lt has, however, laid down performance conditions in the "Code 
of Practice on Vehide Recall", elaborated with the participation of the De-
partment of Transport, who is likewise involved in the implementation of 
recall actions. Self-regulation dominates the situation in the FRG. The spe-
cific Federal authority has no legal power to carry out motor vehicle re-
calls127. All efforts of consumer organizations and automobile clubs to in-
troduce legal rules on recall of cars, failed so far. 
b. Practice of recall activities 
The decision-making procedure in the administrative practice as well 
as in voluntary control schemes appears to be similar to the post market 
control measures for consumer goods. Legal or quasi legal prerequisites 
defining the risk may be found in the United States and in the UK Code of 
Practice. Where legal assistance is not available, manufacturers have to de-
fine the <langer themselves. Record-keeping is a common practice of all 
manufacturers for quite a number of decades. American and English man-
126 Ch. Joerges, 2.1. 
127 J. Falke, 7. 
433 
Hans-W. Micklitz 
ufacturers have to notify possible risks to the competent authorities128. 
These are centrally registered. In practice, informal negotiations and pro-
cedures are dominating. The efficiency rate of recall activities is relatively 
high due to the social status of cars and their economic value. Concrete fig-
ures on the decision-ma.king procedure are available from the United States 
only129. Here, post market control of cars seems to have served as a fore-
runner for the development of specific product saf ety legislation in other 
fields of product regulation. This is true for the development of appropriate 
instruments to exercise administratively induced recall actions. lt is likewise 
true for judicial litigations between the authority and the most important 
car manufacturers in the post market control policy of the Federal 
agency130• The situation in Europe is different. Recall activities with cars 
cannot be brought into correlation with post market control of consumer 
goods. 
V. Post Market Control, Centralism and Federalism 
Post market control activities are confronted with different adminis-
trative and constitutional structures. Centrally administered countries 
should be distinguished from f ederally administered ones. Both state con-
cepts meet different necessities for adapting post market control measures 
to the level of regulation. 
1. Distribution of power 
Compliance is usually managed at the local level, whatever the state 
concept might be. The 300 Swedish local consumer counsellors have an 
auxiliary function only, they have to inform the National Swedish Board for 
Consumer Policies on possible incidents, but they are not endowed with in-
dependent regulatory competence. The local authorities diff er however in 
the extent to which they are independent in ta.king appropriate control mea-
sures. German and Dutch authorities are even obliged to refrain from any 
kind of control if compliance is documented by a specific certification-
mark131. 
The differences between federal and central states are much more ob-
vious in the second major field of post market control: i.e. defining new 
128 G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 7 (II), Ch. Joerges, 2.1.3.1. 
129 Ch. Joerges, 2.1.3.4. 
130 Ch. Joerges, 2.1.3.2. 
131 Cf. III 1. 
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product safety standards. Federally organized states need a cooperation 
mechanism at the level of legislatory competence, as weil as in matters of 
implementation. Autonomy and dependency can take different forms. The 
German "Gerätesicherheitsgesetz" is a Federal Iaw. Implementation how-
ever lies in the band of the Gewerbeaufsichtsämter of the German Länder, 
who are taking measures in their own competence. The situation in Aus-
tralia is different. Territories and the Federal State are concurrent at the 
level of legislation as weil as at the level of implementation. The United 
States has chosen the central solution. The Consumer Product Safety Act is 
a Federal law, the Consumer Product Safety Commission a Federal agency 
with its own administrative structure. Centrally organized states have a clear 
perspective on the distribution of power. But even here independent ad-
ministrative entities are set up, endowed with a certain autonomy to inter-
vene in the market. This is true for the French Commission de la Securite 
des Consommateurs, for the UK Consumer Safety Unit and for the Dutch 
Consumer Safety Institute. 
2. Hinding effect of administrative action 
Federal states have to solve competence conflicts between the Federal 
state and the Länder or Territories at the constitutional level. For the on-
going process of Europeanization of post market control the different solu-
tions found seem to be of much interest. 
The motive behind the adoption of the Consumer Product Saf ety Act 
in the United States was the idea of harmonizing market access rules. The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission was explicitly endowed to set out 
mandatory Federal safety standards as a common orientation for American 
manufacturers. A clearly formulated preemption rule should safeguard the 
priority of the Federal law over state competences132• The Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission however was not in a position to fulfill the legislatory 
mandate and refrained from this policy, not least due to political interven-
tion in the regulatory scheme133• Nowadays technical standards developed 
by private standard-setting organizations should guarantee harmonization 
of American market access rules. De facto, the same diff erences reemerge 
which should have been removed with the adoption of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act. The centrally managed post market control leads however, 
to a far-reaching harmonization of market restrictions all over the United 
132 Ch. Joerges, 4. 
133 Ch. Joerges, in: Ch. Joerges et aJ., loc. cit. 215 et seq. 
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States. The activities of the Consumer Product Safety Commission are 
binding federal-wide. 
The FRG has chosen the opposite road. In order to guarantee a uni-
fied level of protection all over the FRG, the Gewerbeaufaichtsämter are 
bound among themselves· to their decisions134. In Australia, divergent legal 
rules. and divergent post market control actions are possible135• Theoreti-
cally, a preemption rule applies if particular territories: infringe Federal law. 
De facto, possible conflicts between the territories. and the Federal state are 
solved cooperativefy .. The CSCP AC provides for the institutional frame in 
which possible conflicts are managed. 
The problem of the binding eff ect of regulatory decisions is simply un-
known to centrally organized states. Cönflicts might arise if local authorities 
exceed their competence in defining new saf ety standards instead of re-
stricting themselves to mere compliance activities. Overlapping competence 
between Iocal authorities is another issue at stake, which is solved at least in 
the UK by the "home authority principle11136• 
3. Cooperation and coordination 
The need for mechanisms of cooperation and coordinatfon within both 
statutory concepts is striking. Compliance control, even iflocally exercised, 
must be coordinated, in order to ensure that deviations within the same 
country might remain at a low level. Developed mechanisms of cooperation 
exist in Australia and the FRG. The Federal State is in charge of the coor-
clinati'on between the different levels, in Australia - the CSCPAC-137, in 
the FRG - tlie Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz138• The German RAL is 
organising an exchange of experience between the different testing 0odies. 
Centrally administered States meet the same need. In the: UK IocaI: authori-
ties as weil as the officers themselves have organized their own fora of co-
orclination which rapidly Bain importance even as a basis for bilateral coop-
eration with Netherlands 9. De facto, these fora constitute a type of a safety 
agency where all. information concerning product saf ety is managed. In 
France, cooperation and coordination between the different competent 
134 BVerfGE 11, 1 (6), thereto J. Falke, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 164. 
135 D. Harland, 4 b). 
136 G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 6. 0) (ii). 
137 D. Harland, 4 b). 
138 J. Falke, in: Ch. Joerges.et al., loc. cit. 161 et seq. 
139 G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 6 (II) (ii). 
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authorities, including the courts, lies in the hands of the Commission de la 
Securite des Consommateurs. 
4. Exchange of information 
The most important means of cooperation at all levels and within both 
statutory concepts, is the exchange of inf ormation. lt is technically managed 
either by a specific publication, though this may be restricted to the author-
ities concemed as in the FRG140, or in the form of a data bank where all 
relevant and sensitive infonnation is collected. The UK has recently set up 
the HASPROD141 Australia calls its data bank "Alleged Register of Haz-
ardous Products"142• Mechanisms of information exchange cover not only 
regulatory actions but all kind of "peculiarities", incidents and indications, 
which correspond to the notification reports American manufacturers are 
asked to supply143• 
140 J. Falke, German Version, 3. 
141 G. Woodroffe/St. Weatherill, 6 (II) (ii). 
142 D. Harland, 5.7. 
143 Ch. Joerges, 2.3.2.3. 
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Chapter II 
Perspectives for a European Setting of Post Market Control 
The comparative analysis of post market control practice in selected 
Member States of the European Community, Australia, Sweden and the 
United States has set a number of focal points which should be taken into 
consideration for the establishment of a European post market control sp-
tem. A short overview of the already existing Rapid Exchange System 44 
and the planned procedure under the Draft Directive on Product Safety145 
shall introduce the European perspective. European practice and 
European plans will then be contrasted with the results of the comparative 
analysis. 
1. European Approaches to Post Market Control of Consumer Goods -
The Regulatory Framework 
The idea of setting up a European146 post market control system is 
relatively old. The 1975 Programme on Consumer Protection already for-
mulates as a general principle147: 
"goods and services offered to consumen; must be such that un-
der normal or foreseeable conditions of use, they present no risk 
to the health or safety of consumers. There should be quick and 
simple procedures for withdrawing them from the market in the 
event of their presenting such risks." 
But it took another couple of rears before the Spanish oil scandal 
shocked the Community into action 48• The then established Rapid Ex-
change System149 provides for information exchange only and can be re-
garded as an intermediary step to the further development of a European 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
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OJ No. L 70, 13.3.1984. 
OJ No. C 193, 31.7.1989, 1 et seq. 
"Furopean" should be understood as harmonization of national product safety Iegisla-
hon. 
OJ No. 92, 25.4.1975, 92 et seq., 94under15 (a) (i). 
1. Uriarte, The Toxic Syndrom Proceedings in Spain, JCP 12, 1989, Special lssue: Con-
sumer Autonomy and Health Services (ed. N. Reich), 433 et seq. 
OJ No. L 70, 13.3.1984, 16 et seq., cf. the analysis of J. Falke, What should be the Con-
tent of an E.E.C. General Directive on the Safety of Technical Consumer Goods, 
BEUC Suppl. Juridigue, Numero 16, Nov./Dec. 1986; R Milas, La Signification 
Juridique de !'Institution d'un Systeme Communautaire d'Echange Rapide 
d'lnformations sur les Dangers decoulant de I'Utilisation de Produits de 
Consommation, Revue du Marche Commun, 1984, 71 et seq. 
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post market control system. This objective might be realized within the on-
going debate on the adoption of a Product Safety Directive150. 
1. Community System for the Rapid Exchange of Information on Dangers 
arising from the Use of Consumer Products 
"In cases where it is established that consumer products marketed in 
the European Economic Com.munity may endanger the health and safety of 
users in such a way that the rapid implementation of appropriate measures 
is called for, means should exist for the rapid exchange at Community level, 
of information concerning such products and to this end an organized sys-
tem should be established". This has been the official justification for the 
establishment of the Rapid Exchange System. Article 1 obliges any Member 
State who decides to take urgent steps to prevent, restrict or attach partic-
ular conditions to the marketing or use or the possible marketing or use, on 
its territory of a product, or a product batch, because of the serious and 
immediate risk which that product or product batch prevents for the health 
or safety of consumers when used in normal and forseeable conditions, to 
immediately inform the Commission thereof. Whenever possible, the pro-
ducer, distributor or importer of the product or product batch shall first be 
consulted. The system applies to all products intended for use by 
consumers except products intended exclusively for professional use; and 
products which under other Community instruments are the subject of 
equivalent notification procedures (Article 2). 
The Interim Report on the System for the Rapid Exchange151 has 
made clear that medicines, coming under Directive 75/319/EEC and 
81/851/EEC, and notifications on illnesses of animals and residues in food 
and fresh meat in accordance with Directive 74/432/EEC and Directive 
82/894/EEC are considered as equivalent notification procedures
152
. The 
differing safeguard procedures provided for in quite a number of product-
related directives cannot be put on an equal footing with the Rapid Ex-
change System153• They are not aiming at a speedy exchange of information. 
Saf eguard procedures are covering only those kind of product categories, 
for which harmonized standards have already been developed. Safeguard 
procedures might enable quick intervention if necessary, they are mainly set 
up, however, to exercise compliance with Community standards. The Rapid 
150 OJ No. C 193, 31.7.1989, 1 et seq. 
151 COM (88) 562 final, 24.10.1986, cf. Ch. Joerges et al., op. eil. 293 et seq. 
152 Cf. op. cit. Interim Report, No. VI. 
153 Ch. Joerges et al., Joc. cit. 268 et seq., 358 et seq. 
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Exchange System on the contrary concerns serious and immediate risks re-
quiring immediate action. It has not been set up to review long term risks 
which might entail the necessity to adapt product-specific requirements to 
altered circumstances. Foodstuffs, though formally under the scope of ap-
plication of the Community Decision, are further governed by an inf ormally 
introduced and reportedly well-functioning information system. This infor-
mal procedure has not been amalgamated with the non-food sector into one 
rapid exchange mechanism. 
The Commission is located at the center of the inf ormation exchange. 
lt is assisted by an advisory Committee, consisting of two representatives 
per Member State. The representatives of the Member State may be ac-
companied by up to two experts. On receipt of the Member State's deci-
sions, the Commission verifies their conf ormity with the terms of the Rapid 
Exchange Decision and forwards them to the competent authorities of the 
other Member States. The competent authorities of a Member State shall 
then inform the Commission without undue delay of any measures they 
have taken, following receipt of the information referred to in Article 1. On 
receipt of this information, the Commission shall in turn forward it to the 
competent authorities of the Member States. In justified cases and if the 
competent authority of the Member State supplying information under this 
Decision, so requested, the information shall be treated as confidential. The 
Decision, adopted in March 1984 has been set up for a period of four 
years154• The Commission, in the light of the experience obtained, has pre-
sented an Interim Report in 1986 and Final Report in 1988155• The 1988 
Report proposed the continuation of the Rapid Exchange System for a 
further 6 years156. The debate in the Council was. highly controversial. Spain 
refuted the continuation of the Rapid Exchange System without having 
critically reviewed the mechanisms. The Spanish authorities feit somewhat 
discomforted by the notification pursuant to the Spanish oil scandal. Tue 
Council finally decided in December 1988 to prolong the Rapid Exchange 
System until June 1990157• The Commission is asked to present a report on 
the system by June 1989 - an obligation the Community has failed to per-
form so far. 
154 Cf. loc. cit. Article 8. 
155 COM (88) 121final,123.1988, OJ No. C 146, 3.6.1988, 8 et seq. 
156 COM (88) 121final,18.3.1988, OJ. No, C 124, 115.1988, 9 et seq. 
157 OJ No. L 17, 21.1.1989, 51 et seq. 
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2. Overview on the proposed regulatory mechanism for "emergency situa-
tions" of grave and immediate risks under the Council Directive on 
General ProductSafety 
The Draft Directive158 considerably extends the Rapid Exchange Sys-
tem. It proposes a procedure adopting, at Community level, measures ap-
plicable throughout the Community in emergency situations. Tue objective 
should be pursued in a two-fold sense: (1) extending and defining minimum 
requirements for the national shaping of post marlet control; (2) develop-
ing mechanisms for the performance of a European post market contro1 
procedure. 
(1) According to the draft Article 7, Member States are obliged .to 
provide their national authorities with powers commensurate to the re-
quirements of enforcing the general safety duty. The Article refrains, how-
ever, from irnposing specific regulatory means which Member States would 
be compelled to implement. lt refers rather to an indicative list of powers 
lying at the Member States' disposal, in an Annex to the Draft Directive. 
Where a Member State intends to take measures pursuant to Article 7 
which restrict the placing of a product onto, or require its withdrawal from 
the market, the Member State should, to the extent that such notification is 
not required under any specific Community legislation governing the par-
ticular product or product sector concerned, immediately inform the Com-
mission of any such measure, indicating the reasons for adopting it. Briefly 
expressed: although the intended post market control procedure should 
cover emergency situations only, Article 8 establishes a notification duty on 
all kind of regulatory actions taken by the Member State, if the products 
present an "unacceptable risk". Such a comprehensive notification duty 
should be interpreted as a precautionary measure to prevent Member 
States from circumventing their notification duty in emergency situations, by 
simply playing down the risk and dassifying it at not being worthy of notifi-
cation. 
(2) The procedure for adopting, at Community leve~ measures appli-
cable throughout the Community in emergency situations is laid down in 
Article 9 to 14. Article 9 regulates the information channels at the Member 
State level. Member States should develop a centrally administered national 
rapid exchange system guaranteeing rapid transmission of the information to 
the Cornmission. Article 10 restricts the Member State's power to adopt 
regulatory action in emergency situation to merely transitional activities. 
158 OJ No. C 193, 31.7.1989, l et seq.; COM (89) 162 final SYN 192, 7.6.1989. 
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Such a restriction is seen as preconditioning for the adoption of post 
market control measUies at the Community level. 
Article 11 describes the trigger mechanism for Community procedure 
on post market control in emergency situations. The Commissions's knowl-
edge might result from notifications of Member States actions taken under 
Article 8 in the normal procedure or from Member State notification under 
Article 9 in eroergency situations. The latter notification is not limited to 
formal regulatory action, it covers "inf ormation about the existence or the 
likely existence of a grave and im.mediate risk having not only local effects". 
The introduction of the post market control procedure at the Community 
level is bound to three conditions: (1) the possible existence of a grave and 
immediate risk might affect directly or indirectly the saf ety and health of an 
indeterminate number of persons in more than one Member State, (2) the 
grave and immediate risk cannot adequately be dealt with under other pro-
cedures for information, consultation, concertation and decision-making 
and related powers where so laid down under specific Community legisla-
tion, (3) a grave and immediate risk can only be coped with appropriately 
by adopting adequate measures applicable throughout the Community. 
Article 12 defines the consultation and investigation procedure. The 
Commission should iromediately communicate tbe decision to initiate a 
consultation and investigation procedure to the Member States together 
with a summary of the evidence available. The purpose of the procedure is 
to obtain full information to identify its sources and to examine the need for 
adopting appropriate measures. The Commission should have the compe-
tence to request Member states to adopt measures for obtaining compre-
bensive information from all those concerned, per Article U para 3. 
Article 13 provides for the establishment of a Committee on Product 
Saf ety Emergencies which should assist the Commission. The Committee is 
composed of the Member States' representatives and shared by a repre-
sentative from the Commission. Article 14 finally formulates the conditions 
for the decision-making procedure. lt sets out the mechanism for adopting 
interim measures (not permanent!) applicable throughout the Com.munity 
according to the Mana~ement Committee159 variant of Council Decision 
871373 of 13 July 198716 • That is considered as being the most appropriate, 
159 Cf. to the classification of a management committee with the formulation of an overall 
~uropean pro~uct safety po.licy Ch. Joerges/J. J:'alk~, Die Normung von ~onsumgütem 
m der Europa1schen Gemeinschaft und der Richtlinien-Entwurf uber die Allgememe 
Produktsicherheit, Beitrag zur Tagung des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integr<1tion, 9.-
11.11.1989 in Bonn. Tue results of the conference will be published in the Schriftenreihe 
des Rechtskreises Europäische Integration, NOMOS, Baden-Baden. 
160 OJ No. L 197, 18.7.1987, 33 et seq. 
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taking into account the need for rapid action at Community level and the 
necessary involvement of Member States. 
(3) At the time of writing, it seems to be impossible to pred.ict the fu-
ture of the Draft Directive. The discussion within the Council focusses inter 
alia an the proposed mechanism of post market control. There is strong re-
sistance from a number of coWitries towards delegating regulatory power to 
the Community. But even if a revised proposal would considerably deviate 
from the 1989 Model, the post market control issue will subsist. The Rapid 
Exchange System, though insufficient and highly debated might weil con-
stitute an intermediary step towards the full implementation of European 
post market control. A solution must be found, in some form, to realize the 
Interna! Market161• 
II. EEC Post Market Control Regulation, Member States Experience, 
Prospects for the Future -A Comparison 
The comparison of the the European regulatory approach with the 
selected national regulations on product safety regulation in general and the 
post market control in particular will be supplemented by a comparison of 
the administrative practice of post market control in the selected countries 
and the experience gained by the Commission within the Rapid Exchange 
System with the Draft Directive. Setting out pitfalls which might be taken 
into consideration within the shaping of a European system for post market 
control, will round off the analysis. 
1. Comparison of regulations 
The comparison is not meant to be comprehensive162• lt tries to settle 
the Draft Directive into the overall trends of safety regulation
163
• The 
twofold objective of the Draft Directive has to be clearly separated: harmo-
nization of national product safety lerjslation and establishment of a Euro-
pean post market control mechanism 04. 
161 For an in-depth investigation cf. Ch. Joerges et al., loc. cit. 451 et seq. 
162 For more systematic analyis of the Draft Directive in the Eu_ropean perspective of de-
veloping a porduct safety policy, cf. Ch. Joerges/J. Falke, loc. c1t. 
163 Cf. framework of the analysis are the categories applied in chapter I, II. 
164 Cf. I 2. 
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a. The impact of the Draft Directive on the harmonization of Member States 
product safety and post market control legislation 
The Draft Directive defines product safety as a separate policy. lt is 
very much in line with the US approach to regarding product safety as mar-
keting practices regulation165• lt opens up far-reaching perspectives for the 
achievement of an independant product safety policy. This is documented by 
the formulation of a general saf ety duty which is at the heart of the Draft 
Directive. The concept of saf ety chosen remains within the progress made 
from "intended use" to "foreseeable use". The terminology of "unacceptable 
risk" seems tobe near to the US concept of "unreasonable risk"166• Refer-
ence to standards is not explicitly provided for, but technical standards are 
considered as presumption of equivalence to the general safety duty re-
quirement in the absence of mandatory safety rules (Art 5 (2)). 
The Draft Directive does not explicitly engage the Community in a 
programme for development of a specific type of control body167• Art 9 re-
quires the Member States to designate one single authority which is com-
petent for cooperating with the Community on the exchange of informa-
tion168. Although this obligation must be seen in the context of the EEC's 
intention to build up an effective network of information exchange, the plea 
for a central body is indicative. Such a central body must not necessarily be 
endowed with regulatory competence. But Member States experience 
shows that central units are normally given the competence to inform the 
public, be it in the form of an explict delegation of competence, or as an 
implicit power deduced from the overall statutory liablity for the con-
sumer's health and safety. Art 9, though quite modest in language might 
yield a far-reaching effect on the shaping of the institution designed to co-
operate with the Commission, but in fact administering post market market 
control. 
The provisions on the instruments of post market control regulation 
are inspired by the perspective that harmonization of regulatory compe-
tence would be preconditioning for achieving a European product safety 
policy. The Draft develops a twofold approach on the instruments 
necessary for effectively monitoring post market control. 
Firstly, it aims at information on the Member States level. Data coUec-
tion on accidents and risks should be integrated in the national legal system 
for regulating product safety. Art. 7 might be interpreted as an attempt to 
165 Cf. chapter l, II 1. 
166 Ch. Joerges/J. Falke, loc. cit. IV 2. 
167 Chapter 1, II 2. 
168 Cf. b) 
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push the acceptance of an accident surveillance system, as promoted by the 
Community. The obligation of the Member States under Art. 9 to build up a 
national Rapid Exchange System for emergency situations would entail a 
considerable extension of existing information networking in the Member 
States. Art 6 devotes attention to the role manuf acturers and suppliers 
might play in the information raising. They are regarding the manufacturers 
and suppliers as the parties primary responsible, being very much in line 
with the Australian understanding on product recall169• The Draft Directive 
does not impose an obligation on them to report on risks to the national 
competent authorites. lt remains behind the existing rules in the United 
States and Australia170. But the Draft requires the Member States to take 
action ensuring that the supplier of the product makes appropriate ar-
rangements for permanent monitoring. lt relies on cooperation and infor-
mation-sharing between the supplier and the competent authorites. Statu-
tory interventions to secure the notification of information shall apply as a 
last resort only171 • 
Secondly, the Draft pushes for the harmonization of post market con-
trol instruments. The instruments listed in the Annex demonstrate the 
whole set of means necessary for an effective post market control monitor-
ing, "standards", "ban", "seizure" and "recall". lt goes far beyond the means 
available in most of the Member States, wich the exception of France and 
all those non-EEC countries having already introduced product recall 
Iegislation. 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
"Standards ": th) request of appropriate changes in a product or the 
production line1 2; 
"ban": the impostion of the appropriate restrictions as to . the 
conditions of the distri9ution and marketing, and where appropnate, 
of disposal, of product1 3; 
"seizure": the request to seize the product concerned at any stage of 
the manufacturing process and the distribution chain, and wherf7pec-
essary, at the premises or homes of end users or final consumers ; 
"recall": it suffices to refer to the introduction of product recall mech-
. d bli . . 175 an1sms an pu c warmng not1ces . 
Cf. chapter I, II 3 c. 
Cf. chapter I, II 3 a. 
Cf. Art 7 in connection with the indicative list (2), second hyphen. 
Annex 2, (2) (h ). 
Annex 2, (2) (g); attention deserves the po~iblity to re~late ~he disposal i;if ~nsafe 
products. There is no such power tobe found m any of the mvestigated countnes prod-
uct safety legislation. 
Cf. for further details of the recall procedure, cf. under b) (6). 
Cf. Chapter I, II 3 a. 
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The Draft Directive uses the term "indicative list": "lt is meant to sys-
temize such powers and clarify their possible use in principle in respect of 
all relevant sectors"176. But the indicative list might become attached with 
mandatory effects. Firstly, because Member States are under an obligation 
to report all kind of activities to the Community and not only emergency 
measures177 and secondly, because the measures shall be at the disposal of 
the mana~ement committee i.e. they should be introduced at the Commu-
nity level1 8. 
b. The European procedure on post market control 
The analysis of the Draft Directive takes the view of recall regulation 
in the investigated countries179 in order to facilitate a comparison and in 
order to highlight the difficulties for a Europeanization of post market 
control mechanisms. 
(1) The administrative entity as foreseen in the Draft Directive is cer-
tainly the most striking innovation of the Draft Directive. The 1984 Rapid 
Exchange System has not yet been set out with the intention of building up 
regulatory competences. The obligation of the Member States to report on 
the activities they have taken pursuant to the notification to the Commission 
could not be yet understood as an intervention into the competences of the 
Member States themselves. Community measures, taken by the Cornmission 
in emergency situations, it was originally thought, should be directly appli-
cable. The now published Draft Directive stays away from this even more 
ambitious concept. Member States should remain in charge of enforcing the 
European measures agreed upon within the decision-making procedure un-
der Article 14. Homogeneous implementation of the Community measures 
could be guaranteed only, if all Member States would have the same legal 
instruments at their disposal - another reason for the quasi-mandatory 
character of the indicative list. 
(2) The Draft Directive picks up the now well established differentia-
tion between the normal and the emergency procedure in the investigated 
countries and adapts it to the needs of a European post market control 
management. Terminology used in differentiating risks is taken from the 
French law on product safety: "whenever the Commission has knowledge „ 
of the possible existence of a grave and immediate risk". But a European 
176 COM (89), 162 final -SYN 192, 7.6.1989, Proposal for a Council Direcitve conceming 
general product safety, 10 under Art 7. 
177 Cf. Art 8. para 2, cf. Ch. Joerges/J. Falke, loc. cit. 
178 Cf. Art 11 c. 
179 Cf. chapter l, II 3 c. 
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management of emergency situations can be justified only if community-
wide action is necessary to fight the unsafe product. Such a European con-
cern should be assumed if more than one Member State is concerned by the 
grave and immediate risk, per Art. 11. Local and regional emergent imme-
cliate and grave risks are excluded from the European management of post 
market control
180
• They have to be notified only if the emergent danger 
unf olds transboundary effects. The present Rapid Exchange System does 
not formally restrict the notifications to national regulatory activies. 
(3) lnvestigating the danger means for the proposed European man-
agement of post market control first and foremost that the Member States 
perform their notification obligations. Notifications from the Member 
States constitute the platform of operation for the European management 
of emergency situations within the Commission. The Commission is not en-
dowed to undertake self-initiated research on the existence of emergency 
situations. "Knowledge" of the existence of a grave and immediate risk, 
which is preconditioning for initiating the consultation and investigation 
procedure under Art. 12 may be the product of one or more different 
sources of information: (a) from notifications on emergency situations pur-
suant to Art. 9, (b) from notification of Member States' action taken against 
unacceptable risks, Art. 8 (2), (c) from "knowledge" deriving from external 
sources like consumer complaints or press release. The Commission has a 
relatively broad set of inf ormation devices and it is free to decide whether it 
wants to initiale a consultation and information procedure or not. 
But it goes without saying that the management will depend on the 
feasibility and the workability of the notification system. The Draft Direc-
tive does not make clear how the flow of information from the Member 
States to the Commission shall be secured. Art. 9 (3) refers to "detailed 
procedures for the transmission of information" which shall be adopted by 
the Commission in agreement with the competent authorities of the Mem-
ber States". The position of the Commission is somewhat better if it has al-
ready got been notified of the existence of a risk from whatever source of 
information. lt can then request the Member States concerned to supply all 
information about the matter which such Member State is seized of or 
which it can obtain181. If the Commission has already initiated a consulta-
tion and investigation procedure Member States are even obliged upon re-
quest of the Commission, to take appropriate measures against the party 
h d . h b . . . . f t' 182 c arge wit o tammg appropnate m orma 10n . 
180 Art8. 
181 Art 8 ( 4). 
182 More specifically, the measures under (2) (a)-(c) of Annex 2, Art 12. (3). 
447 
Hans-W. Mick/itz 
Access to notifications is limited to the Member States and the Com-
mission. The 1986 Interim Report on the Rapid Exchange System183 has 
mentioned the possibility of integrating consumers into the distribution of 
compentences. lt has taken into consideration the transmission of notifica-
tions without mentioning the name of the product and the name of the 
manufacturer. Art 6 of the Draft Directive addresses the Member States 
authority to keep the information confidential. But it permits the publica-
tion of information, if it is necessary to ensure adequate protection fo 
health and safety. No mechanism is provided for to decide on the concrete 
conditions under which information should be made public184• 
(4) The consultation and investigation procedure can be considered 
the equivalent of an "adminstrative hearing" as foreseen in Australian and 
American product safety legislation. But access at the Community level is 
- once more - Iimited to the Member States. No third parties are admit-
ted to participate in the procedure. This does not mean that third parties 
are competely excluded from the European management of post market 
control. The enforcement authorities of the Member States, which carry out 
the measures adopted within the manageroent committee, are obliged to 
give any party concerned an opportunity to submit its views185• What might 
be understood by "parties concerned" is nowhere defined, it could accord-
ing to the UK terminology, encompass consumers186. But such an interpre-
tation is not binding. 
(5) The regulatory means made available to the management commit-
tee are simply enumerated in the indicative list of Annex 2. They cover inter 
alia the request addressed to manufacturers, importers and where neces-
sary other professionals to disseminate adequate warnings to all persons 
likely to be exposed to the risk involved 187 as weil as the warning of the 
public either by the manufacturers, importers and other professionals or by 
the competent authori~188• But there is no ranking between the two ways of 
alerting the consumer1 9. The provisions on recall are worth being quoted 
in full: 
"the request of a product recall already placed on the market, -
even where it is already in the possession of an end user or final 
consumer and, where necessary, its destruction under appropri-
183 Cf.loc. cit. 5 et seq. 
184 Cf. the study undertaken for the Commission by ZERP, G. Winter. 
185 Cf. Art 144. 
186 G. Brüggemeier, in: Ch. Joerges et al„ loc .cit. 112. 
187 Cf. Annex 2 (2)(e). 
188 Cf. Annex 2 (2)( d) and ( e ). 
189 Cf. chapter 1, II 3 c. 
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ate conditions, according to the circumstances Member States 
may 
(aa) invite a manufacturer to voluntary recall, in the most 
eff ectve way, the product concerned, 
(bb) order manufacturers to 9&call, in the most eff ective way 
the product concerned1 ". 
There are no provisions on replacement, repair or refund to be found. 
Recall as a regulatory instrument is introduced but not clearly shaped. The 
decision making procedure within the management committee leaves the fi-
nal responsibility with the Council of Ministers. Criticism has been raised 
against the five-days delay, in which the Council would have to take action, 
in case of deviations from the Commission's proposal, Art. 14 para 1. The 
extremely short delay would lead to a de facto autonomy of the Commission. 
2. Com parison of administrative practice 
Practical experience to illuminate the functioning of the proposed 
mechanims for a European post market control management may be drawn 
from selected Member States and from the Rapid Exchange System. Mem-
ber States experience may provide assistance in the risk assessment, the in-
vestigation of the danger, the shaping of the administrative hearing, more 
precisely the extent to which third parties might participate and last but not 
least in the management of the recall mechanism. Extremely helpful would 
be efforts to rank different degrees of dangers to different kind of 
actions191 and to transpose the recall in a corrective action plan or code of 
recall192• But the presentation of the post market control management in 
the foregoing chapter has demonstrated the specific prerequistes for a 
European mechanism of post market control. Information networking has a 
key role to play. And here Member States experience and administrative 
practice of the Rapid Exchange System might be fruitfully combined to 
pinpoint some basic pitfalls for the further development of inf ormation 
networking. 
a. Coverage of notifications - f onnal and informal action 
The administrative practice of post market control within the investi-
gated Member States, Sweden, Australia and the United States is deter-
mined by informal negotiation patterns. The Rapid Exchange System does 
190 Cf. Annex 2 (2) (i). 
191 Cf. chapter l, II 3 c. 
192 Cf. chapter l, IIl 3 c. 
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not explicitly cover informal regulatory actions, although the addressees of 
the Rapid Exchange Systems have voluntarily transmitted informal actions 
to the Commission. The latter does not seem to appreciate the notification 
of voluntary control activities. Notifications of voluntary actions are said to 
refrain manufacturers and importers from taking appropriate control mea-
sures because they feel that their image on the market might be jeopar-
dized193. lt is difficult, however, to imagine that notifications whose distri-
bution is kept confidential throughout the Community, might reach the 
public and, secondly, if voluntary measures are excluded from the notifica-
tions, European post market control could cover only 5% of all control ac-
tivities of the competent authorities. We wonder whether the different 
sources of information under the proposed mechanism on post market 
control can guarantee comprehensive inf ormation by the Commission of 
these voluntary actions194. 
Local and regional controls play an important role within the investi-
gated states. The opponents of a Europeanization of post market control 
often argue against the necessity of notifying local and regional activities. 
Those controls are said to concern only a limited number of products within 
a limited area in the country itself. Experience shows however, that highly 
engaged local and regional control entities might have far-reaching influ-
ence at the central or federal level. Setting those activities aside would 
mean the restriction of a central source of information for Community ac-
tion and that is exactly what Art. 8 of the Draft Directive is doing. 
b. Inf ormational and organizational deftciencies of information networking 
Notifications are useless if they do not contain the information which 
is necessary for the addressee to take appropriate action. Article 1 para 2 of 
the Council Decision establishing the Rapid Exchange System, defines the 
kind of information which should be notified to the Commission. In prac-
tice, however, quite a number of difficulties arose in the extent to which 
Member States were 'Willing to comply with their notification duty. The 1986 
Interim Report195 as weil as the 1988 Final Report196 deplores the unwill-
ingness of Member states to provide the Commission with Juli inf ormation 
of all relevant cases. If relevant cases are notified, the information given is 
often delayed and not comprehensive enough for taking action. Same 
Member States seem to pursue a quite strange but obviously effective strat-
193 Cf. loc. cit. 13 et seq. 
194 Cf. II 1 b. 
195 Cf. loc. cit. 5 et seq. 
196 Cf. loc. cit. 11 et seq. 
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egy. Cases are collected within the Member State for a certain period of 
tim_e and then transmitted altogether uno acto to the Commissioni97. lt re-
mams to be seen whether the proposed powers given to the Commission 
under the Draft Directive will suffice to secure full informationl98. 
Comparative analysis has underlined the overwhelming role of con-
sumer complaints, expert experience of insurance companies, certification 
bodies and testing institutions for the investigation of the <langer. The Draft 
Directive as weil as the Rapid Exchange System is, on the contrary 
state/administration orientated. Non-statutory information may be intro-
duced only indirectly as "knowledge" which is necessary to initiate the con-
sultation and investigation procedure. A systematic integration of all these 
information sources, however, is not even guaranteed in all Member States, 
its' integration involves far-reaching consideration of the future structure in 
the Community199• 
3. Pitfalls of the European approach to post market control 
The intention here is namely to highlight some issues which should be 
taken into consideration in the ongoing debate on the future shaping of Eu-
ropean post market control; issues which have been neglected not only at 
the European level. 
a. Standing committee on consumer safety 
There is no forum in the Community where safety issues can be dis-
cussed. The Draft Directive is providing for the establishment of a com-
mittee. But such committee would be engaged in emergency situations only. 
If it is true that informal dispute settlement determines the Member States 
practice of post market control, it would be all the more important to have 
a forum in which information could be systematically exchanged. A Stand-
ing Committee on Consumer Safety2°0 should be established. Such a com-
mittee should have consultative tasks only and should be composed not only 
of Member States' representatives, but also of representatives from non-
govemrnental organizations and perhaps even from represent~tives of non-
EEC countries. lt should be an overall consumer saf ety comm1ttee, open to 
197 
198 
199 
200 
Cf. COM (88) final, OJ No. C 124, 11.5.1988, 9 et seq. 
Cf. II 1 b. 
Just like the rote of the individuals on the Community level. Som.e .effort is made 01_1 the 
intergration of certification bodies into a European concept_. Dec1s1on of the Counc1l OJ 
C 10, 16.1.1990, 1 et seq., thereto Ch. Joerges/J. Falke, loc. c1t. 
Cf. Ch. Joerges et al„ 457 et seq. 
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any subject which is related to product safety and not only the management 
of post market control201 
b. Participation of consumers in post market control 
The comparative analysis has underlined the limited role consumers 
and consumer organisations are playing in the administrative management 
of post market controL For a further development of post market control 
mechanims it would be indiscßensible to investigate the role of consumers 
and consumer organisations2 . Such an approach should discuss problems 
of access to information by consumer organisations fo administrative activi-
ties, whether .this is informal or formal; it should reflect the participation of 
consumer organisations in all kind of decisions, whether formal or informal 
ones. One might even go so far as to challenge the confidential character of 
the decision-making process at the Community and at the Member States' 
level. Public hearings could be a responsible alternative to the present 
practice in most EEC countries. Last but not least, it would be feasible to 
debate the introduction of a group action for consumer organisations giving 
them the power to approach safety authorities, requiring action and to 
bring the affair to the Court if the competent authorities refuse to take 
appropriate measures. 
c. Export to non-EEC countries 
The discussion on the shaping of post market control mechanisms sets 
more or Iess aside those problems resulting from the export of "banned and 
servely restricted11203 products, i.e. the export of products which are subject 
of marketing restrictions or even a ban domestically but which may never-
theless be exported to non-EEC countries. Only some of the investigated 
countries, the United States, Australia, France and Sweden are providing 
for the possibility of informing these import countries of potential market 
restrictions on their domestic markets or simply prohibiting the export204. 
201 
202 
203 
204 
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The idea is to create a counterpart to the Standing Committee under the New Ap-
proach, Ch. Joerges et al., Joc. cit. 446 et seq. 
Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Considerations Shaping Future Consumcr Participation in Euro-
pean Product Safety Law, in: Ch. Joerges ( ed.), loc. cit. 
This is the term used on the international !evel with the diferent UN bodies for those 
products whosc marketing is restricted or evcn forbidden; cf. D. Harland. 
Cf. for rhe United States S.L Cohen, Exwrt of Hazaroous Products from the United 
States: An Analysis of Consumer Proouct Safety Commission Policy; the George 
Washington Journal of International Law and Economic, 123-163; for Australia D. 
Harland, 10; for France Art 2 and 3 de Ja Loi; for.Sweden, Nils Ringstcdt, ?. 
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~ other Member States of the Community are pursuing a laisser faire pol-
icy. 
The 1984 Rapid Exchange System has not yet made an effort to get to 
grip with the very touchy export issue. One year later, however, the Com-
mission announced in its "New Impulse" the intention to integrate third 
countries into the information exchange system205• The Draft Directive 
does not, however, provide for any kind of export regulation. This is all the 
more astonishing as the proposed system does not even consider coopera-
tion with the OECD206• Consumer organizations are very critical in this re-
spect. They are calling for a clear prohibition of the expert of products 
which are restricted or banned domestically. 
III. Conclusions 
Whatever the solution for an establishment of a European post market 
control mechanism might be, it should have to take into consideration that 
there are differences in product safety regulations and that these differ-
ences will subsist ior quite a while within the Community. The comparative 
analysis has made clear that there are safety and risk countries. Such an at-
tribution might be possible under two aspects: (1) the degree of judicializa-
tion, or the extent of institutional independency respectively, and (2) the 
activities of competent post market control authorities to withdraw unsafe 
products from the market. There seems to be a coherent interrelationship 
between the irnprovement of legal instruments, the degree of institutional 
independency and the efficiency of adminstrative practice. Without dis-
criminating against particular Member States of the Community, it seems as 
if the United States, Australia and Sweden have the furthest developed 
product safety law and the best functioning product safety implementation 
system. There are always remarkable differences to be reported from the 
EEC Member States which could be finalized and specified if the spectrum 
of the investigated countries could be extended. 
The overall message, however, independently of ranking of safety and 
risk countries is this: Europeanization of post market control should make 
use of the existing differences in the Member States when dealing with 
product safety. Legal rules within a European post market control proce-
dure should be shaped so as to permit safety-orientated countries to take 
the lead in the promotion of European product saf ety. This could be clone 
by clearly distinguishing between minimum Standards, leaving space for 
205 COM (85) 314 final, 23.7.1985, under 25. 
206 N. Ringstedt, OECD, Safety and Consumer Poliey, JCP 9 (1986), 57 et seq. 
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safety countries as a forerunner for a further development and maximum 
standards which are binding on all Member States207. lt would be likewise 
useful and necessary to provide for an opportunity to consult non-European 
countries in the process of the decision-making. Non-EEC countries, this is 
true, could not participate in the Committee on Product Safety Emergen-
cies. But the extent to which it might be possible to consult the leading 
safety countries from abroad and from Northern Europe, should be taken 
into consideration. 
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